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Abstract. Functional encryption (FE) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that generalizes many asymmetric
encryption systems proposed in recent years. Syntax and security definitions for general FE were recently
proposed by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters (BSW) (TCC 2011) and independently by O’Neill (ePrint 2010/556).
In this paper we revisit these definitions, identify several shortcomings in them, and propose a new definitional
approach that overcomes these limitations. Our definitions display good compositionality properties and allow
us to obtain new feasibility and impossibility results for adaptive token-extraction attack scenarios that shed
further light on the potential reach of general FE for practical applications. The main contributions of the paper
are the following:
– We show that the BSW definition of semantic security fails to reject intuitively insecure FE schemes where
a ciphertext leaks more about an encrypted message than that which can be recovered from an image under
the supported functionality. Our definition (as O’Neill’s) does not suffer from this problem.
– We introduce an orthogonal notion of setup security that rejects all FE schemes where the master secret
key may give unwanted power to the TA, allowing the recovery of extra information from images under
the supported functionality. We prove FE schemes supporting all-or-nothing functionalities are intrinsically
setup-secure and further show that many well-known functionalities are all-or-nothing.
– We extend the equivalence result of O’Neill between indistinguishability and semantic security to restricted
adaptive token-extraction attacks (the standard notion of security for, e.g., IBE and ABE schemes). We
establish that this equivalence holds for the large class of all-or-nothing functionalities. Conversely, we show
that the proof technique used to establish this equivalence cannot be applied to schemes supporting a
one-way function.
– We show that the notable inner-product functionality introduced by Katz, Sahai, and Waters (EURO-
CRYPT 2008) can be used to encode a one-way function under the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem,
and hence natural approaches to prove its (restricted) adaptive security fail. This complements the equiv-
alence result of O’Neill for the non-adaptive case, and leaves open the question of proving the semantic
security of existing inner-product encryption schemes.
Keywords. Functional encryption, Semantic security, Indistinguishability, Preimage samplability, Adaptive
token extraction model, Inner-product encryption, Small integer solution.
1 Introduction
Functional encryption (FE) is a public-key primitive that generalizes many encryption systems, including
public-key encryption, identity-based encryption, searchable encryption, attribute-based encryption, and
all other variants of predicate encryption systems [BSW11]. In such a system, each decryption key TKf
(called a token) is associated with a function f (which may be viewed as a circuit). When a token holder
runs the decryption algorithm on a ciphertext encrypting a message m, it recovers the image f(m). A
trusted authority holding a master secret key is responsible for issuing tokens. This allows the TA to
control which users can recover which images from encrypted data. Realizing such a powerful primitive for
complex functionalities could revolutionize information security applications in a way that is comparable
to the notable case of fully homomorphic encryption. For example, one might encrypt a data set (e.g., a
set of photographs) and share it in a cloud environment; the ability to issue tokens would then allow a user
to award access to the results of different computations over the data set (e.g., partially blurred images).
Interestingly, very recent developments in this area indicate that this may indeed be within our reach.
For example, a concrete realization of functional encryption for arbitrary functionalities has been recently
proposed in [GVW12], as well as functional encryption for regular languages in [Wat12].
The intuitive security requirement for a functional encryption scheme is that no information should
leak from a ciphertext bar that which can be recovered via legitimately obtained decryption tokens. As for
other encryption primitives, there are various ways in which this intuition can be formalized. In the case of
public-key encryption, for example, the two standard formalizations are semantic security and ciphertext
indistinguishability.
Semantic security is a simulation-based definition that measures to what extent real-world attacks on
a cryptosystem can be replicated in an ideal world. Roughly speaking, in the real world an adversary is
given a ciphertext c encrypting a message m sampled from a distribution M; its goal is to recover some
information v about the encrypted message. In the ideal world, a simulator must replicate the output of
the adversary in the real world but now without having access to the ciphertext. (We include a variant by
Goldreich [Gol04] in Appendix B.) Clearly, if one can show that such a simulator exists, then the ciphertext
in the real world must be (computationally) hiding all information about the encrypted message and the
encryption scheme can be considered secure.
Although semantic security is an intuitive and desirable security goal, it may be cumbersome to work
with due to its simulation-based formalization. Luckily, by the seminal equivalence result of Goldwasser and
Micali [GM84] indistinguishability-based notions (e.g., IND-CPA) have proved to offer a convenient path
to establishing the semantic security of public-key encryption schemes. The same approach was adopted
for virtually all other primitives that can be classified as particular cases of functional encryption. Indeed,
for all these primitives, the standard notions of security are indistinguishability-based ones and semantic
security is not considered explicitly. In hindsight, the implicit assumption in all of this prior work was that,
similarly to public-key encryption, an equivalence between indistinguishability and an intuitive security
notion akin to semantic security would also hold for these primitives.
Somewhat surprisingly, in independent works, Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW11] (BSW from here on)
and O’Neill [O’N10] have shown that this is not the case for functional encryption schemes supporting
complex functionalities. Indeed, both works demonstrated limitations in the indistinguishability-based no-
tion for functional encryption and proposed strictly stronger semantic security notions to overcome these
problems. These results highlight the importance of converging to a definition of semantic security for func-
tional encryption that can be adopted as a de facto standard by the community. However, the definitional
approaches adopted in both works are significantly different and the relation between the two is not well
understood. In particular, it is not clear whether there are fundamental differences between the two so as
to determine which one of them should be favored in detriment of the other.
The goal of this paper is to change this state of affairs. We analyze the positive and negative aspects of
the definitions laid down by BSW and O’Neill and find that both approaches have strengths that should
be preserved, and yet they also have weaknesses that should be reconsidered. We propose a new balanced
set of definitions that incorporates the results of this analysis.
Analysis of previous definitions. Boneh, Sahai, andWaters [BSW11] provide an elegant generalization
of the syntax of FE schemes, aiming to capture concrete primitives such as Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE), Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), and Predicate Encryption (PE) as particular cases. The authors
propose a natural indistinguishability-based security definition for this new primitive, but then present a
counterexample scheme showing that this notion of security is inadequate for general functionalities: the
scheme is intuitively insecure, but can be proven IND-CPA-secure. A notion of semantic security using black-
box simulators is then proposed to address this problem, which is argued to exclude intuitively insecure
schemes such as those presented in the aforementioned counterexample. The paper concludes with a series
of feasibility results. On the positive side, the authors show that it is possible to construct semantically
secure schemes supporting PE in the random-oracle model starting from any indistinguishable FE scheme
supporting such functionalities. On the negative side, BSW show that semantically secure schemes do not
exist even for simple functionalities such as IBE. This result hinges on the adversary’s capability to perform
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adaptive token-extraction queries that corrupt, a posteriori, the security of the challenge ciphertext; this
is a stronger attack model than that which is captured by the standard notions of security for primitives
such as IBE, ABE, or PE.
Perhaps surprisingly, in this work we show that the BSW definition is too weak in the sense that it
also fails to exclude some intuitively insecure schemes. The problem resides in the fact that the ideal-world
simulator is allowed to control the generation of the global parameters for the functional encryption scheme.
We show that this renders the simulator unreasonably more powerful than the real-world adversary, allowing
the simulator to retain trapdoor information that permits recovering information from images f(m), which
otherwise would be hidden and cannot be recovered in the real world. Based on this observation, we present
a counterexample scheme supporting a trapdoor one-way permutation (TDP) that is clearly intuitively
insecure, yet can be proven BSW semantically secure.
Independently of Boneh et al., O’Neill [O’N10] proposed an alternative definitional approach to func-
tional encryption schemes for general functionalities. The author presents alternative syntax, correctness,
and indistinguishability-based security notions that are conceptually close to those in [BSW11], but proposes
a significantly different semantic security definition. The paper then discusses the feasibility of achieving
semantic security, by first presenting a separation to the indistinguishability notion, and then introducing a
simple property for supported functionalities, called preimage samplability, under which the two notions are
equivalent for non-adaptive token-extraction attacks. The fact that functionalities such as IBE and inner-
product encryption [KSW08] are shown to be preimage samplable provide positive results for semantically
secure FE schemes supporting such functionalities.
Analyzing the semantic security model proposed by O’Neill we find that it does not suffer from the
same problem we identified for the BSW definition. Indeed, the ideal-world simulator in O’Neill’s definition
must work with honestly sampled global parameters, which means that it is unable to “cheat” by keeping
extra trapdoor information. Nevertheless, we present other counterexamples for which the intuitive notion
of security is not at all clear, but which can be proven secure under O’Neill’s model. As an example,
consider a functional encryption scheme supporting a TDP that reveals the corresponding trapdoor along
with the decryption token. Should such a scheme be considered intuitively insecure? The distinction here
is that information is leaked via tokens, rather than by the ciphertext, which means that it is hard to
say such a scheme should be rejected by a semantic security definition. On the other hand, one can argue
that a security definition for functional encryption should reject schemes that fail to preserve the security
properties of the supported functionalities. Finally, as the author acknowledges [O’N10], O’Neill’s notion
of semantic security does not suitably deal with adaptive token-extraction attacks.
Main contributions. We now detail our main contributions.
Syntax. We start in Section 2 by tailoring the syntax and correctness definitions of functional encryption so
as to capture the standard definitions for primitives such as IBE, ABE, PE, etc., as particular cases. This
was not strictly the case with previous approaches. In particular, we identify a notion of full correctness,
which maps to the notions adopted in [O’N10,BSW11], and imposes that the decryption operation explicitly
returns a failure symbol when the functionality is undefined for a particular input value.
Indistinguishability. We modify the notion of intentional leakage [BSW11] to the slightly different concept
of potential leakage in Section 3. This allows us to dissociate syntactic aspects (e.g., we do not need to
include a special empty token in the syntax of the primitive) from the security aspects of an FE scheme.
Potential leakage captures the general restrictions that must be in place to ensure that various security
models exclude attacks on functional encryption schemes based on information that the scheme is not
designed to conceal, e.g., the length of messages or the identity of the receivers. Through this notion we are
able to define indistinguishability-based security as a natural generalization of the equivalent notions for
standard primitives, and automatically get feasibility results that do not require transforming the original
schemes (which strictly speaking was not the case in previous works).
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Semantic security. Having identified a number of limitations of the semantic security models proposed
by BSW and O’Neill (Section 4), in Section 5 we propose a notion of semantic security that incorporates
features from the definitions by BSW, and also by O’Neill. Again, our goal is to faithfully generalize the
definitions of semantic security for primitives like PKE [Gol04] and IBE [ACG+06]. We observe that full
adaptive token extraction models are not typically considered in such schemes, and so we propose a restricted
adaptive token-extraction attack model. The restriction we impose intuitively prevents an attacker from
obtaining decryption tokens that would allow it to trivially corrupt an encrypted ciphertext a posteriori, in
the style of non-committing encryption [Nie02]. Put another way, our semantic security definition permits
specifying the message distributions from which encrypted messages may be drawn, along with matching
restrictions on the tokens that can be issued by the TA a posteriori, in order to provide FE security
guarantees in a more flexible usage scenario. Using this strategy we circumvent impossibility results for
unrestricted token extractions [BSW11]. Finally, we show that our semantic security definition displays
a desirable composition property: security against single-message attacks implies security against multi-
message attacks, even under restricted adaptive token-extraction attacks, thereby allowing us to present
our results in the simpler single-message scenario.
Setup security. Our definition of semantic security preserves the resilience of O’Neill’s definition in rejecting
schemes that leak information to the adversary via the ciphertext. However, like all previous definitions,
it does not provide any safeguards against leakage via decryption tokens or the master secret key. We
therefore go on to introduce a new notion of setup security which enforces that tokens (or more strongly
the setup procedure of the system) do not release any privileged information that might enable token
holders or the trusted authority to obtain information which would otherwise be hidden by images values
(Section 6). We show that setup security excludes all intuitively insecure schemes that we consider in the
paper, while being inclusive enough to enable positive results for existing FE schemes. More precisely,
we show that functionalities admitting a conditional preimage sampling procedure have an intrinsically
secure setup procedure. We show PKE and IBE schemes, and more generally FE schemes supporting all-
or-nothing functionalities, where an image either entirely reveals the encrypted message or nothing at all,
are conditionally preimage samplable.
Adaptive equivalence. In Section 7 we present some positive feasibility results for our proposed notion of
semantic security. There we extend O’Neill’s results for non-adaptive token-extraction attacks and propose
a variant of preimage samplability (PS) that enables us to obtain an equivalence between IND-CPA-secure
and semantically secure functional encryption under restricted adaptive token extraction. Moreover, our
requirement is weaker than that of O’Neill if we are only interested in the non-adaptive token extraction
scenario. Finally, we show that conditional preimage samplability (as defined to establish setup security)
also implies our stronger notion of preimage samplability. We immediately get that indistinguishability-
based security is equivalent to semantic security under restricted adaptive token-extraction attacks for
all-or-nothing functionalities. This gives a wide range of positive results for (multi-message) semantically
secure functional encryption that extends previous known results.
Inner products. We conclude the paper in Section 8 by presenting negative results for inner-product encryp-
tion (IPE). These results bring a twist to our extension of O’Neill’s work: it is not the case that all the equiv-
alences between semantic security and indistinguishability established by O’Neill for non-adaptive token
extractions carry over to our restricted adaptive scenario. Concretely, we show that although inner-product
encryption is proven by O’Neill to satisfy the preimage sampling property [O’N10], this functionality is
provably not preimage samplable under the more restrictive PS notion that we introduce. Technically we
show that, for certain parameterizations of the inner-product functionality, a successful preimage sampler
can be used to break the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem. This leaves open the question of proving the
semantic security of existing inner-product encryption schemes under restricted adaptive token-extraction
attacks.
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2 Syntax and Correctness
We start by fixing the notion that we will be using throughout the paper. We write x← y for assigning value
y to variable x. We write x←$ X for sampling x from set X uniformly at random. If A is a probabilistic
algorithm we write y ←$ A(x1, . . . , xn) for the action of running A on inputs x1, . . . , xn with random
coins chosen uniformly at random, and assigning the result to y. We use “:” for appending to a list. For a
random variable X, we denote by [X] the support of X, i.e., the set of all values that X takes with nonzero
probability. PPT as usual stands for probabilistic polynomial-time. All algorithms are PPT unless stated
otherwise. We say ν(λ) is negligible if |ν(λ)| ∈ λ−ω(1). We use bold font, e.g., m, to denote a vector, and
slightly abuse notation when applying a function to each element of a vector, writing f(m) when we mean
(f(m1), . . . , f(mn)), for m = (m1, . . . ,mn). We use [X]i for the ith component of X, and [X]
j
i for the ith
through jth components. We denote the `2 norm of a vector x by ‖x‖2.
2.1 Functional encryption
Syntax. We now define the syntax for a functional encryption (FE) scheme, where the function space
may, in general, depend on the public parameters of the system; see the discussion below. Such a scheme
is specified by four PPT algorithms as follows.
1. Setup(1λ): This is the setup algorithm. On input a security parameter 1λ, it outputs a master secret key
Msk and a master public key Mpk. Implicitly included in Mpk are a function/circuit space description
FunSp and a message space MsgSp. The function space FunSp consists of descriptions of circuits f :
MsgSp→ MsgSp ∪ {⊥}.
2. TKGen(f,Msk): This is the token-generation algorithm. On input a function f and a master secret key
Msk, it outputs a token TK for f .
3. Enc(m,Mpk): This is the encryption algorithm. On input a message m and the master public key Mpk,
it outputs a ciphertext c.
4. Dec(c,TK): This is the deterministic decryption algorithm. On input a ciphertext c and a token TK, it
outputs a message m ∈ MsgSp or the special failure symbol ⊥.
Correctness. The special symbol ⊥ in the co-domain of functions accounts for functions that may
be undefined on parts of their domain, or for which we do not expect the cryptosystem to behave cor-
rectly. Accordingly, we call an FE scheme correct if, for all λ ∈ N, all (Mpk,Msk) ∈ [Setup(1λ)], all
m ∈ MsgSp(Mpk), all c ∈ [Enc(m,Mpk)], all f ∈ FunSp(Mpk), and all TK ∈ [TKGen(f,Msk)], we have that
f(m) 6=⊥ =⇒ Dec(c,TK) = f(m). We call an FE scheme fully correct when the f(m) 6=⊥ restriction is
removed. In other words, the decryption algorithm must also return ⊥ whenever f(m) =⊥. The definition
of correctness can be weakened in several ways. For instance one can relax the correctness condition so it
holds only with an overwhelming probability over the choices of random coins for various algorithms. One
may consider a game-based notion of correctness where a computationally bounded adversaries, with(out)
access to the master secret key, aims to violate the system’s functionality by outputting a malicious m
and/or function f . All of our results carry over to these scenarios, and we do not consider them for the
sake of simplicity.
Function spaces. We say an FE scheme FE supports f if for any set of random coins used in the setup
procedure we have that f ∈ FunSp. We say an FE scheme has a fixed function space if for each value of
the security parameter, the set of functions that the scheme supports is fixed and independent of the coins
of the setup procedure.
Comparison with the previous definitions. There are two differences to the definition in [O’N10].
First, O’Neill stipulates that the function space is indexed by the security parameter, yet it is fixed and
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independent of the setup algorithm. However, for a number of primitives such as inner-product encryption
and attribute-based encryption, the function space may depend on the parameters generated by the setup
algorithm. Second, we do not require correctness to hold when the function evaluates to ⊥. As we will see,
this weaker correctness notion allows us to see standard PKE, IBE, and other schemes as particular cases
of functional encryption. Strictly speaking, this was not possible with the definition in [O’N10]. A correct
FE scheme according to [O’N10] can be written as a fully correct scheme in our syntax, and vice versa.
One presentational difference between the definition in [BSW11] and that of ours is that we treat
functions explicitly whereas BSW define a general functionality F (K, ·) indexed by keys K. This difference
is inconsequential as the description of a function can be interpreted as a key. In both definitions various
spaces can depend on the public parameters.3 Furthermore, we do not rely on a special empty key to model
leakage of side information such as plaintext length. We will deal with this issue when defining the security
of an FE scheme later on. Finally, our definition of correctness differs from BSW in the same way as it
differs from that of O’Neill’s.
2.2 Instantiations
We now show that a number of standard cryptographic primitives can be seen as special cases of the func-
tional encryption syntax and correctness conditions as defined above. Other primitives such as attributed-
based encryption, predicate encryption, and inner-product encryption can be captured in a similar way.
Public-key encryption.Given a correct PKE scheme, we can recast it as a correct FE scheme supporting
the (fixed) function space consisting of the identity function id(m) := m only. Conversely, given a correct FE
scheme supporting the identity function, we can recast it as a correct PKE scheme. The identity function
is fully defined and hence correctness and full correctness coincide.
Identity-based encryption. Given a correct IBE scheme supporting identities ID ∈ IDSp(Mpk), we
may recast it as a correct FE scheme supporting the functions
fID∗(m, ID) :=
{
(m, ID) if ID∗ = ID ;
⊥ otherwise,
for ID∗ in the identify space IDSp(Mpk). The converse transformation also holds.
Weakly robust IBE. Note that the above correspondence assumes correctness on both sides. For full
correctness, we obtain a primitive that closely resembles a weakly robust IBE scheme [ABN10]. In such an
IBE scheme, it is infeasible to find a message and two distinct identities such that a random encryption
of the message under one identity decrypts successfully to a non-⊥ value under the second identity with
non-negligible probability. Indeed, a fully correct FE scheme as above gives a weakly robust IBE scheme.
Conversely, a weakly robust IBE gives rise to an FE scheme for which full correctness for the above
functionality holds with overwhelming probability.
Hidden-vector encryption. Boneh and Waters [BW07] proposed a hidden-vector encryption (HVE)
system. In such a system, the message space comprises pairs (m,x), where x is a vector of n elements in
{0, 1} and the function space is indexed by a vector y of n elements in {?} ∪ {0, 1}, where we refer to ? as
the wildcard character. More precisely, the function space is given by
fy(m,x) :=
{
m if Match(x,y);
⊥ otherwise,
3 This is somewhat implicit in [BSW11] and as we shall see it has implications towards the security of a scheme.
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where Match(x,y) represents predicate yi = ? ∨ xi = yi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Similarly to above, with the
caveat that the standard HVE definitions impose full correctness, any HVE scheme gives a fully correct
FE scheme supporting the above function space under our syntactic definitional approach, and vice-versa.
3 Indistinguishability
To formalize various security definitions, we will be using a language similar to the code-based game
playing [BR06]. We omit the Initialize and Finalize procedures, and define an explicit interaction between
a game Game and an adversary A. We use AO as a short hand for an adversary A that has access to all
the oracles defined in a game. In each game we restrict attention to legitimate adversaries, a condition that
is defined specifically for each game.
We define an indistinguishability-based notion of security that is tailored to capture different gradings of
security for the same functionality. Indeed, the game is parameterized by a PPT relation R that defines the
admissible set of challenge queries. This relation generalizes the restriction of choosing challenge messages
with the same length in public-key encryption. By requiring R(m0,m1) to hold in the challenge query,
one acknowledges that challenge queries that violate this restriction may lead to a (trivial) break. This
approach decouples security concerns from the correctness of the scheme. We refer to the relation R as the
potential leakage relation.
Definition 1 (IND-CPA Security). Let game IND-CPAFE,R,A be as defined in Figure 1. The IND-CPA
security of an FE scheme relative to potential leakage relation R, requires the advantage of any adversary
A = (A1,A2) to be negligible, when this is defined as
Advind-cpaFE,R,A(λ) := 2 · Pr [IND-CPAFE,R,A(λ)⇒ T]− 1.
Game IND-CPAFE,R,A(λ):
b←$ {0, 1}; TKList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
b′ ←$ AO(Mpk)
Return (b′ = b)
oracle LR(m0,m1):
c←$ Enc(mb,Mpk)
Return c
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
TKList← f : TKList
Return TK
Fig. 1. Game defining the IND-CPA security of an FE scheme. An adversary is legitimate if: 1) it calls LR once and with a
pair (m0,m1) such that R(m0,m1) holds; 2) for all f ∈ TKList have f(m0) = f(m1); and 3) in the token non-adaptive model,
it does not call Token after calling LR.
Potential leakage.We now discuss how the potential leakage relation should be defined for the example
instantiations we presented in the previous section, so that the resulting notion of security exactly matches
the standard notions of security for those cryptographic primitives. A list is given in Table 1.
PKE R(m0,m1) := |m0| = |m1|
IBE R((m0, ID0), (m1, ID1)) := |m0| = |m1| ∧ ID0 = ID1
Anon. IBE R((m0, ID0), (m1, ID1)) := |m0| = |m1|
HVE R((m0,x0), (m1,x1)) := |m0| = |m1|
FE [O’N10] R(m0,m1) := |m0| = |m1|
FE [BSW11] R(m0,m1) := (m0) = (m1)
Table 1. Examples of the potential leakage relation.
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Note the distinction between the different IBE flavors. In IBE, identities may be leaked and hence we
must exclude challenge queries where two different identities are provided. This restriction is removed in
anonymous IBE. The indistinguishability notion of security for weakly robust IBE (unlike the correctness
requirement) is identical to that for IBE schemes.
Security. Not only can we relate the syntax of functional encryption schemes to that of existing primitives
but, under the appropriate potential leakage relations in the table above, we can also reduce IND-CPA
security of an FE scheme to an existing primitive and vice versa. Our choices therefore lead to a notion of
functional encryption scheme that is indeed a generalization of existing cryptographic primitives.
Relation with O’Neill’s definition. In [O’N10] the implicit potential leakage relation is fixed to be
the equality of the message lengths, i.e., R(m0,m1) := (|m0| = |m1|). Although this is a natural choice, the
resulting security definition fails to generalize those for IBE schemes (be it anonymous or non-anonymous).
Indeed, non-anonymous IBE schemes cannot be captured under this definition as the functions take the
identity as an input. For anonymous IBE schemes, the restriction artificially imposes that the sum total
of lengths of the messages and identities queried to the left-or-right oracle to be equal. Our choice for the
potential leakage relation deals with these issues in a cleaner way and is closer in sprit to the approach
taken in [BSW11]. It is straightforward to see that a feasibility result under O’Neill’s definitional choices
leads to a feasibility result in our setting with a fixed function space, full correctness, and with respect to
the length equality relation. The converse also holds.
Relation with BSW. Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW11] define a special empty key (function)  that
is aimed at capturing information about encrypted messages that might be publicly recoverable from
ciphertexts (typically including the message length). Formally, the authors assume that the token for this
empty key is itself empty and, by the correctness requirement for the scheme, it follows that any party
can run the decryption algorithm on a ciphertext to recover this so-called intentionally leaked information.
However, this requirement implies that the standard syntax definitions for PKE, IBE, and other primitives
do not naturally generalize to functional encryption and deviates from our goal. In BSW, for example, it is
stated that an IBE should attach the message length and target identity to the ciphertext to strictly meet
this requirement. This in turn forces us to reason about the implications of such transformations, e.g., for
the scheme’s security.4 Our understanding is that the definitional choice corresponding to the empty key
is mostly motivated to allow for an elegant definition of indistinguishability-based security. We, however,
believe that our approach via relation R separates security issues from syntactic and correctness issues,
while still maintaining the flexibility of the BSW definition. More formally, if the potential leakage relation
is defined to be R(m0,m1) := ((m0) = (m1)), queries that allow adversaries to exploit the empty token
are excluded.
Given the discussion above, we can translate between feasibility result for the BSW definition of function
encryption and our definition. Any scheme that is secure under the BSW definition yields a fully correct
and secure scheme under our definition, when one introduces the appropriate syntactic changes and adopts
a potential leakage relation that excludes challenge queries that could allow adversaries to explore the
empty token. A conversion in the other direction implies transforming the scheme so that it explicitly leaks
information through the empty token (e.g., attaching extra information to the ciphertexts, or adding a
special token to the public parameters that leaks this information). The resulting scheme should not only
be fully correct under our definition but also leak information that induces challenge query restrictions in
the BSW model that match the original potential leakage relation. In this case, a security result in our
model, yields a BSW-secure scheme.
4 For example, for CCA security to be preserved, the decryption algorithm must also be changed with additional checks.
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4 Limitations of the Models by BSW and O’Neill
It is well known that the standard notions of indistinguishability and semantic security for public-key
encryption are equivalent [Gol04]. Indeed, the initial motivation for indistinguishability was to allow for a
simpler strategy to establish that an encryption scheme achieves semantic security. However, a closer look
at the indistinguishability notion of security for FE schemes reveals that a similar strategy is not valid for
general functionalities. The problem is as follows [BSW11]. For some functionalities the restriction on the
LR oracle imposing that f(m0) = f(m1) can prevent the adversary from simultaneously extracting the
token for f and launching a meaningful chosen-plaintext attack. To see this, consider any function f for
which it is infeasible to find collisions. For example, if the function is injective, it is clear that any adversary
that extracts the token for this function will be prevented from calling the challenge oracle on anything
other than m0 = m1. However, in this case, the adversary will have no chance of winning the IND-CPA
game.
4.1 The BSW model
Boneh et al. go on to turn this observation into a concrete functional encryption scheme supporting a
one-way permutation that is intuitively insecure, but can be easily shown to satisfy the IND-CPA security
definition. Roughly speaking, in this scheme one encrypts m under a standard PKE scheme. The token for
the one-way permutation function f is the secret key for the PKE. Upon decryption, one first recovers m
and then computes f(m). The scheme is clearly correct. However, since f(m) hides m computationally, the
functional encryption scheme is not guaranteeing that the decryptor learns no more about the encrypted
message than that which is leaked by f(m). On the other hand, one can easily show that this FE scheme
is IND-CPA-secure if the underlying PKE is itself IND-CPA-secure: if an adversary extracts the token for f ,
which is a permutation, then it is bound to calling the challenge oracle on m0 = m1; if it does not extract
the token, then a simple reduction shows that it is attacking the PKE scheme.
Given the inadequacy of indistinguishability, Boneh et al. gave a semantic security model for FE schemes
in the spirit of the semantic security definition given for PKE schemes [Gol04]. We recall this definition
here.
Definition 2 (BSW Semantic Security). The semantic security of an FE scheme requires that there ex-
ists a (black-box) simulator S = (S1,S2,S3) such that for any adversary A = (A1,A2) and all distinguishers
D the advantage
Advss-cpaFE,A,S,D(λ) := Pr [SS-RealFE,A,D(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [SS-IdealFE,A,S,D(λ)⇒ T] ,
is negligible, where games SS-RealFE,A,D and SS-IdealFE,A,S,D are shown in Figure 2. Here,  denotes the
intentional leakage function corresponding to the empty token.
Game SS-RealFE,A,D(λ):
TKList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(m, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
c←$ Enc(m,Mpk)
v ←$ AToken2 (Mpk, c, st)
trace← (Mpk,m, st, v,TKList)
Return D(trace)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
TKList← f : TKList
Return TK
Game SS-IdealFE,A,S,D(λ):
List← [ ]
(Mpk, τ)←$ S1(1λ)
(m, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
v ←$ SEval,A◦2(Mpk,·,st)3 ((m), τ)
trace← (Mpk,m, st, v, List)
Return D(trace)
oracle Token(f):
(TK, τ)←$ S2(f, τ)
Return TK
oracle Eval(f):
List← f : List
Return f(m)
Fig. 2. Games defining the BSW semantic security of an FE scheme [BSW11]. In the ideal game, notation SA◦2(Mpk,·,st)3 denotes
that S3 has black-box access to A2, to which it must pass a ciphertext, and for which it must simulate a Token oracle.
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We defer a discussion of the technical details of the definition to a subsequent section when we present
an alternative. Nevertheless, we highlight at this moment the intuition behind the definition, as this is
central to our main result in this section:
(BSW Intuition) The information leaked by a ciphertext and a set of decryption tokens is no more
than that leaked by an equivalent set of images to a party who controls the generation of system
parameters.
Boneh et al. show that the above counterexample scheme for a one-way permutation f is not semantically
secure, thereby providing evidence that semantic security is the correct notion of security for functional
encryption. However, this raises the question if the semantic security model of BSW itself is adequate. We
answer this question in the negative by using a similar argument to that given above for the inadequacy
of indistinguishability: we demonstrate an intuitively insecure scheme that can be proven secure under
the BSW model. Our result hinges on the fact that the ideal-world experiment allows the simulator to
control the generation of system parameters and hence the description of the function space. This gives it
an advantage over the real-world adversary, as it may be able keep trapdoor information that allows it to
recover extra information from the images obtained from the Eval oracle.
The counterexample.We restrict ourselves to the non-adaptive token extraction model so as not to fall
within the range of impossibility results established in [BSW11]. (This only strengthens our argument.) In
other words, we disallow A2 from querying the Token oracle. We note that our argument also goes through
for the weaker definition of semantic security that is used in [BSW11, Definition 5] to present a (stronger)
impossibility result when adaptive token-extraction queries are disallowed.
Consider a functional encryption scheme constructed from a public-key encryption scheme PKE and a
one-way trapdoor permutation TDP as defined in Figure 3. The scheme provides the expected functionality
by encrypting an input message under a standard PKE, and simply evaluating the TDP upon decryption.
The token corresponding to the TDP is simply the PKE secret key. The trapdoor for the TDP is not kept
as part of the secret parameters, and to make the point clearer one should think of it as being “destroyed”
upon generation. Consider also that the intentional leakage for this scheme is defined as |m|. The scheme
is clearly correct.
alg. Setup(1λ):
(f, f−1)←$ TDP.Gen(1λ)
(pk, sk)←$ PK.Gen(1λ)
Msk← sk
FunSp := {f}
Mpk← (pk,FunSp)
Return (Msk,Mpk)
alg. Enc(m,Mpk):
pk← Mpk
c←$ PK.Enc(m, pk)
Return (c, |m|)
alg. TKGen(f,Msk):
sk← Msk
Return sk
alg. Dec((c, |m|),TKf ):
sk← TKf
m← PK.Dec(c, sk)
Return f(m)
Fig. 3. An intuitively insecure but BSW-secure FE scheme from a PKE scheme and a family of TDPs.
Following the same reasoning as in the previous counterexample, this scheme leaks too much information
to a decryptor holding a token for f : it will learn m, whereas only the image under the TDP should be
leaked. Now consider the following BSW simulator (S1,S2,S3):
– S1 executes Setup(1λ), but now it keeps the trapdoor for the TDP in its state. It returns Mpk and
τ = (Mpk,Msk, td).
– S2 answers the token-extraction queries, using Msk stored in its state, and updates the state to record
the token-extraction queries placed by the adversary. Note that since only one functionality is supported,
it is either the case that the adversary makes no token-extraction queries, or it extracts the token for
f .
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– S3 first checks if the adversary extracted the token for f . If not: 1) it generates a random message
vector of appropriate size; 2) it constructs a ciphertext c encrypting the message vector under Mpk;
and 3) it calls the adversary oracle on c, and outputs whatever A2 returns. Otherwise: 1) it calls Eval
to obtain f(m); 2) it uses the trapdoor in its state to recover m (note that the result is guaranteed
to coincide with the original encrypted message given that the TDP is injective); 3) it constructs a
ciphertext c encrypting that message vector under Mpk; and 4) it calls the adversary oracle on c and
outputs whatever A2 returns.
It is easy to show that simulator S always succeeds in simulating A’s output, as long as the underlying
PKE is IND-CPA-secure. If the adversary extracts the token for f , then the simulator is able reconstruct a
perfect simulation of the ciphertext in the real game. On the other hand, if the adversary does not extract
the token, then any adversary/distinguisher pair that detect the change in the ciphertext distribution can
be used to break the IND-CPA security of the underlying PKE scheme.
Remark. The counterexample above is not based on the definition of the function space itself, but rather
on the fact that an entity who controls parameter generation can keep trapdoor information on it. To make
this point clearer, in Appendix A we present another version of this counterexample where we show that the
problem remains even for functional encryption schemes where the function space is fixed and independent
of the global parameters: we take a BSW semantically secure functional encryption scheme supporting all
circuits in a family of trapdoor permutations, and then convert it into a scheme that is still semantically
secure, but intuitively insecure. This means that, somewhat counter-intuitively, the BSW definition can
also be inadequate for FE schemes with a fixed function space.
4.2 O’Neill’s model and its potential shortcomings
We recall the semantic security model of O’Neill. As acknowledged by the author, the definition in [O’N10]
fails to adequately capture adaptive token-extraction attacks, and hence we restrict attention to the non-
adaptive scenario.
Definition 3 (O’Neill’s Semantic Security). Let games SS-RealFE,A and SS-IdealFE,A,S be as shown in
Figure 4. The semantic security of an FE scheme requires that for any adversary A = (A1,A2,A3), there
exists a simulator S such that the advantage function below is negligible.
Advss-cpaFE,A,S(λ) := Pr [SS-RealFE,A(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [SS-IdealFE,A,S(λ)⇒ T]
Game SS-RealFE,A(λ):
TKList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
st←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, t)←$ A2(Mpk, st)
c←$ Enc(m,Mpk)
t′ ←$ A3(c, st)
Return (t = t′)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
TKList← (f,TK) : TKList
Return TK
Game SS-IdealFE,A,S(λ):
TKList← [ ]; List← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
st←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, t)←$ A2(Mpk, st)
List← [f(m) : (f, ·) ∈ TKList]
t′ ←$ S(Mpk, List,TKList, st)
Return (t = t′)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
TKList← (f,TK) : TKList
Return TK
Fig. 4. Games defining O’Neill’s semantic security for an FE scheme in the non-adaptive token-extraction model [O’N10].
Once again we defer a discussion of the technical aspects of the definition to the next section, where
we discuss the differences to our own definition. However, it is important at this point to highlight the
intuition behind O’Neill’s definition:
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(O’Neill’s Intuition) The information leaked by a ciphertext and a set of decryption tokens is no
more than that leaked by an equivalent set of images and tokens.
There is a fundamental difference between this definition and that of BSW: the simulator is no longer in
control of the generation of systems parameters. In return, a token-extraction oracle is provided in the
ideal game. This means that the same strategy we presented above to argue for the inadequacy of the
BSW definition does not apply directly to the definition by O’Neill. Nevertheless, other potential problems
remain that we discuss next.
Potentially insecure scheme 1. We modify the BSW counterexample scheme as follows. The setup
procedure is similar to before, except that the trapdoor for the randomly chosen permutation f is no longer
destroyed but kept in the master secret key of the system. The token-generation algorithm is modified
so that the token for the TDP contains the trapdoor (as well as the secret key for the PKE scheme).
The encryption and decryption routines are as before. This scheme can be proven secure under O’Neill’s
definition: although the simulator can no longer generate the trapdoor information itself, this piece of
information will become available once the adversary extracts the token for f . It is unclear if this scheme
is intuitively insecure as the ciphertext does not leak any information beyond that leaked by images and
tokens.
Potentially insecure scheme 2. Consider the following trivial construction of an FE scheme supporting
its own encryption circuit. Take a PKE scheme and set the message space of the FE scheme to be (m, r)
pairs. Take a PKE keys (sk, pk) and set the master secret key to be sk and the master public key to be pk. To
functionally encrypt m re-encrypts under pk the ciphertext c resulting from Enc(m, pk; r). The decryption
token is simply sk and decryption recovers and outputs c. This construction is clearly correct and it can be
shown to be semantically secure under the previous semantic security definitions. It is also unclear whether
it should be classified as insecure. On the one hand, it is hard to argue that it is intuitively insecure. This
is because the function is evaluated on the sender’s side and encrypted under a secure encryption scheme.
Furthermore, the decryptor is the legitimate holder of the decryption key, and hence from its perspective
there is no security property associated with the evaluated function. However, one can also consider things
from the perspective of the encryptor, e.g., she might expect that token holders recover nothing but a
ciphertext, but this is clearly not the case.
5 The New Semantic Security Model
In this section we propose new a definition of semantic security that avoids the above problems while
simultaneously achieving several other goals of interest. Our definition is designed to be strong enough to
exclude the clearly intuitively insecure counterexample we presented for the BSW definition and capture
adaptive token extractions, without being infeasible to achieve due to its excessive strength. Furthermore,
the definition should be compatible with the standard approaches to define the semantic security of PKE
and IBE schemes. To this end, we directly start by giving the details of the definition, and justify our
choices momentarily.
Definition 4 (Semantic Security). Let games SS-RealFE,R,A,D and SS-IdealFE,R,S,D be as shown in Fig-
ure 5. The semantic security of an FE scheme relative to potential leakage relation R requires that for any
PPT adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a legitimate PPT simulator S = (S1,S2) such that for all PPT
distinguishers D the following advantage function is negligible.
Advss-cpaFE,R,A,S,D(λ) := Pr [SS-RealFE,R,A,D(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ)⇒ T]
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Game SS-RealFE,R,A,D(λ):
FuncList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
c←$ Enc(m,Mpk)
v ←$ AToken2 (c, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return TK
Game SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; m←⊥
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ SEval1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
ImgList← [f(m) : f ∈ FuncList]
v ←$ SEval2 (ImgList, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Eval(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return (TK, f(m))
Fig. 5. Games defining the semantic security of an FE scheme under restricted adaptive token-extraction attacks. An adversary
is legitimate if: 1) R(m0,m1) holds for every pair of messages in [M]1; 2) for all second-stage Token queries f , we have that
f(m0) = f(m1) for all m0,m1 ∈ [M]1; and 3) in the token non-adaptive model, A2 and S2 do not call Token and Eval
respectively.
The intuition behind the definition is as in the previous definitional approaches: an adversary should
learn no more about an encrypted message than that which is explicitly revealed by the functions associated
to the decryption tokens that it obtains. To this end, we require the existence of a simulator that does
not have access to the ciphertext, but only to the images of the encrypted message under the same set
of functions. This simulator is bound to producing an output that essentially looks like that produced by
the adversary in the real world, which implies the ciphertext indeed reveals no extra information. More
in detail, the simulator must emulate A1’s output and produce an output v that matches the information
recovered by A2 from the ciphertext. However, the simulator is denied access to the ciphertext, and is bound
to obtaining a set of images that matches those recovered by the real-world adversary via its Token oracle
(this last restriction is imposed by including FuncList in trace). Like in the indistinguishability model, the
potential leakage relation can be used to exclude trivial attacks whereby the real-world adversary would
obtain information trivially leaked by the ciphertext (whereas this would not be available in the ideal
world). Finally, we observe that the token-extraction queries performed by the adversary in the second
stage are restricted to functions that are constant over the support of the message distribution. This allows
us to generalize the feasibility results that are well known for particular instances of functional encryption,
namely IBE schemes. For this reason, we call this model semantic security under restricted adaptive token-
extraction attacks.
We now justify various definitional choices that we have made in the semantic security definition above.
Free simulators. In contrast to the previous definitional approaches, the simulators have a more general
form in our definitions (modulo the generation of parameters; see below). More precisely, compared to
O’Neill’s definition, we have replaced adversary A1 with a simulator. This was done for the sake of clarity
of the definition, and also brings the definition closer to the standard approach to defining semantic security
for public-key encryption. The BSW model assumes a black-box simulator of special form.
Parameters and oracles. We do not allow the simulator to control the generation of global parameters.
We provide the simulator with the master public key and give it access to decryption tokens, and hence
our definitional choice here is closer to that of O’Neill. Our choice here is motivated by the principle that
the simulator should not be more powerful than the adversary. This restriction, for example, forbids the
simulator from tweaking the function space of the scheme, and hence the BSW counterexample that we
discussed above can no longer be shown semantically secure (any simulator that succeeds with non-negligible
probability in outputting v = m will contradict the security of the TDP). A token-extraction oracle should
be provided to the simulator to compensate for the fact it no longer has access to the master secret key.
Note also that in order to bind the simulator to work with the provided master public key, we must include
it in the trace.
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Distinguishers. In our definition, the outcomes of both the real-world and ideal-world experiments are
obtained by passing the guessed information v and a full trace of the execution to a distinguisher D.
The trace includes the master public key, the list of extracted functions, the message distribution, and
auxiliary information t about the challenge message that we call a hint. By requiring that the traces are
indistinguishable and including FuncList in the trace, we meaningfully capture the restrictions on second-
stage queries placed by the simulator, which was an acknowledged problem in [O’N10]. On the other hand,
adversaryA3 in O’Neill’s definition is trying to guess an value t that is chosen byA2 along with the challenge
message. Consequently, the t = t′ test at the end of the game can be seen as a canonical distinguisher,
getting hint information t, consistently with our approach. For this reason, this choice strengthens our
definition with respect to O’Neill’s and is similar to the approach in [BSW11]. Indeed, the hint t plays
a similar role to the state of the adversary in the BSW definition: it is provided to the distinguisher but
hidden from the black-box simulator. Finally, this feature is fundamental to ensure that our definition
composes from single-message to multi-message scenarios, even under restricted adaptive token-extraction
attacks (see below for a formal statement of this result). This justifies that our presentation of the definition
for the single-message scenario is without loss of generality.
Message distribution. In the BSW definition A1 directly outputs the message vector, whereas in our defi-
nition the adversary outputs a message distribution. There are two reasons for this. First, in our definition
the simulator obtains leakage about the challenge message via the message distribution that ensures a
balance with the leakage information available to the adversary via the challenge ciphertext (this balance
is established via the restriction imposed by the potential leakage relation on the support of the message
distribution output by a legitimate adversary). The same effect is achieved in BSW by explicitly providing
the intentional leakage to the adversary, which implies the incorporation of the empty token into the syntax
of functional encryption. Second, by introducing this change, we are able to establish equivalence to the
indistinguishability notion for a larger class of schemes, even under restricted adaptive token-extraction
attacks.
The message distribution in our definition does not output only a message, but also history information
h that is given both to the adversary and the simulator, and an additional hint t that is provided only to the
distinguisher. As we mentioned above, this is fundamental to obtain a composition theorem. Furthermore,
it can be also related to the BSW model as follows. The BSW adversary can keep privileged information
in its state, akin to a powerful history function h(m,Coins(M)) that can take the coins used in sampling
the message itself [BDPR98]. This corresponds to the history information h in our definition.
Our definition differs from O’Neill’s in a similar way: we have replaced adversary A2 with a message
distribution. We note that O’Neill’s definition seems closer to our choice, as the description and the inputs
of A2 can be seen as hardwired intoM. Conversely, we may view the state information as the description
of a message distribution that A2 runs. Furthermore, as mentioned above, A2 outputs a value t that is
fed to a canonical distinguisher that simply checks t = t′. However, a critical extension in comparison to
O’Neill’s model is that we provide history information h to both the adversary and the simulator.
Adaptive token queries. It is shown in [BSW11] that unrestricted token-extraction queries in the second
stage lead to instantiability problems akin to those encountered in non-committing encryption [Nie02]. We
therefore tailor our definition to exclude second-stage token-extraction queries under which such problems
may arise. Intuitively, we rule out scenarios in which the trusted authority issues tokens that might allow
an adversary to trivially corrupt, a posteriori, the security of past encryptions. We will see that for many
FE scenarios this yields a natural definition of semantic security in the sense that it is equivalent to the
indistinguishability-based notion for large classes of circuits, even under restricted adaptive token attacks.
We emphasize that this attack model generalizes those adopted for standard primitives, including IBE,
and ABE schemes [Gol04,ACG+06]. As in the previous definitional approaches, we include the extracted
functions in the trace so that the simulator is forced to make similar queries in the ideal game.
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We summarize the features of our new definition: 1) free simulators, 2) honest parameter generation
(as in O’Neill), 3) use of general distinguishers (closer to BSW), 4) message generation via a message
distribution (closer to O’Neill), 5) history information (closer to BSW), and 6) hint for the distinguisher
(present in both O’Neill and BSW).
Composition. Observe that the IND-CPA definition can be shown to compose from single to multiple
LR queries (i.e., from a single-message to a multi-message attack scenario) using a standard hybrid ar-
gument [BDPR98]. One of the crucial features that our semantic security definition enjoys is that it also
composes. Below we show that a multi-message variant of our definition where the message distribution
outputs a vector of messages (see Appendix D for the details) is equivalent to the single-message version
above.
Theorem 1 (Composition). Let FE be a functional encryption scheme that is semantically secure under
the (single-message) definition in Figure 5. Suppose that there is a polynomial poly such that for any single-
message adversary A, there is a semantic security simulator S[A] such that
TimeS[A](λ) ≤ TimeA(λ) + TimeM(λ) + poly(λ) and TimeS[M](λ) ≤ TimeM(λ) + poly(λ) ,
where M is the distribution output by A and S[M] is the simulated message distribution. Then for every
real-world multi-message PPT adversary A′, there exist a real-world single-message PPT adversary A and
a multi-message PPT simulator S ′ such that for any distinguisher D′, there exists a distinguisher D for
which
Advm-ss-cpaFE,R,A′,S′,D′(λ) ≤ Q(λ) ·Advss-cpaFE,R,A,S,D(λ) ,
where S is the simulator implied by the single-message semantic security and Q(λ) is an upper bound on
the number of messages that the message distribution algorithms outputs.
Proof (Overview). We give an overview of the proof here and leave the details to Appendix D. The proof
for the non-adaptive case is essentially a simulation-based hybrid argument. Consider the attack models
where in the ith hybrid, for i = 0, . . . , q, the adversary has access to (q − i) ciphertexts and i image lists.
In each step we change a ciphertext to the corresponding image list. We show that for any adversary in
the ith hybrid model, there is an adversary in the (i + 1)st hybrid that does equally well. To see this,
note that the adversary in the ith hybrid can be viewed as a single-message real-world adversary that
also receives some extra auxiliary information consisting of ciphertexts and image lists. By the semantic
security guarantees of the scheme we may replace this adversary by an equally good one that only gets
the image list for the replaced ciphertext. This concludes the proof as the qth hybrid corresponds to the
ideal-world multi-message semantic security game. Note that the running time of the final simulator in the
ideal game, which recursively depends on the previous simulators, stays polynomial if the condition given
in the theorem is satisfied.
In the case of restricted adaptive token-extraction attacks, the argument is slightly more intricate, since
part of the auxiliary information received by the adversary in the ith hybrid cannot be generated in the
first stage of the adversary that we construct against single-message security (this is because some of the
images will only be defined on second-stage token-extraction queries). However, under restricted adaptive
token-extraction queries, it is possible to simulate the extra images on the fly directly from the description
of the message distribution and the extracted token. uunionsq
Remark. The restriction on the running time of the single-message simulator can, for black-box simulators,
be intuitively interpreted as an imposition that the simulator runs the adversary at most once. We will
return to this later in the paper, when we construct black-box simulators for a large class of FE schemes.
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Composition of BSW and O’Neill. We do not know if the BSW and O’Neill’s models compose. In the
case of O’Neill’s definition, it seems that the model lacks the necessary features to allow a proof technique
similar to that used for Theorem 1. More in detail, O’Neill’s definition does not allow modeling of message-
dependent history information, and this is often necessary for composition of simulation-based security
models [DDN00,Gol04].
6 Setup Security
In the previous section we defined a security model that (among other things) excludes the clearly intuitively
insecure TDP-based counterexample from Section 4.1 that was problematic for the BSW semantic security
model. In this respect, our security model has the same advantages as those of O’Neill. Unfortunately,
similarly to O’Neill’s model, our definition fails to exclude the counterexamples from Section 4.2 (because
the simulator also has access to decryption tokens). This raises the question of whether our model can be
strengthened further so these schemes are also ruled out. One direct approach to achieve this would be to
further restrict the simulator by denying it access to tokens (as well as the master secret key) in the ideal
world. We present this model in Appendix C and show that it is infeasible to achieve (essentially because a
correct simulation of tokens would imply breaking the functional encryption scheme one is trying to prove
semantically secure). We therefore take a different approach.
The first observation we make is that our definition accepts these counterexamples because indeed they
do not leak information through the ciphertext. In fact, leakage is enabled by the combined information
provided by images and decryption tokens (or more generally the master secret key). Intuitively, once
a trapdoor for a TDP is provided to a token holder, the TDP circuit essentially becomes an efficiently
invertible encoding function from messages onto images, offering no (intuitive) security whatsoever. From
the point of view of the semantic security definition, where the aim is to exclude schemes where ciphertexts
leak more information than that which is leaked by images, these counterexample schemes should therefore
be considered secure.
However, it is still a reasonable security goal to expect that tokens do not help a token holder to extract
information from images that would otherwise be hidden by the functionality. We therefore consider the
stronger setting where the master secret key is required not to compromise the security properties of the
supported functionalities. Informally, this means that even the trusted authority holding the master secret
key should not be able to hold any “trapdoor” information on the functionalities supported by the functional
encryption scheme.
A new notion of security. Our approach to formalizing this security notion, which we call setup
security, is as follows. We consider an attack scenario where an adversary is given the master secret key
Msk and adaptively interacts with an evaluation oracle for the functionality in order to construct a trace
that contains the master public key, a list of functions, a message distribution, a list of images, and a
function func that models leaked information. This trace establishes the adversary’s claim as to his ability
to extract information from the images, which is specified by the leakage function. The FE scheme will then
be setup-secure if a simulator given only the trace and the same set of images provided to the adversary,
i.e., without having access to the master secret key, can extract essentially the same information.
Definition 5 (Setup Security). The setup security of an FE scheme relative to potential leakage relation
R requires that for any adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a simulator S such that the advantage function
AdvsetsecFE,R,A,S(λ) := 2 · Pr [SetSecFE,R,A,S(λ)⇒ T]− 1
is negligible, where game SetSecFE,R,A is shown in Figure 6.
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Game SetSecFE,R,A,S(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; b←$ {0, 1}
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ A1(Msk,Mpk)
m←$M
(func, v0)←$ AEval2 (st)
ImgList← [f(m) : f ∈ FuncList]
trace← (Mpk,M,FuncList, ImgList, func)
v1 ←$ S(trace)
Return (vb = func(m))
oracle Eval(f):
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return f(m)
Fig. 6. Game defining the setup security of an FE scheme. An adversary is legitimate if R(m0,m1) holds for every pair of
messages in [M].
It is easy to see that all the potentially insecure TDP-based counterexamples that we have introduced
are excluded under this definition. Indeed, let A1 be the adversary that outputs the uniform message
distribution and places a single query to the Eval oracle containing the trapdoor permutation. Algorithm
A2 is defined to invert the image using the trapdoor contained in the master secret key. The leakage function
func is set to be the identity function. Then, any simulator for this adversary would lead to a successful
inverter for the TDP. The counterexample involving double encryption is treated similarly.
Setup security via conditional preimage sampling. We show that the above definition (unlike
“strong” semantic security; see Appendix C) allows natural classes of functionalities to be proven secure.
To this end, we introduce a notion of conditional preimage samplability. Roughly speaking, this asserts
that given a message distributionM and a list of functions [fi]ni=1, it is possible to efficiently sample from
M when this is conditioned on a set of images [fi(m)]ni=1 for some m ∈ [M]. The actual definition is
slightly more complex, as we need to deal with possible adversarial adaptiveness (hence the inclusion of
the Eval oracle) as well as define indistinguishability of conditional distributions in a meaningful way (this
is achieved via the third stage of the adversary A3).
Definition 6 (Conditional Preimage Samplability). We say a functional encryption scheme supports
a conditionally preimage samplable (CPS) functionality relative to potential leakage relation R if, for any
PPT adversary A := (A1,A2,A3), there exists a PPT sampler Samp such that the advantage
AdvcpsFE,R,A,Samp(λ) := 2 · Pr [CPSFE,R,A,Samp(λ)⇒ T]− 1
is negligible, where game CPSFE,R,A,Samp is shown in Figure 7.
Game CPSFE,R,A,Samp(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; b←$ {0, 1}
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ A1(Msk,Mpk)
m1 ←$M
st←$ AEval2 (st)
ImgList← [f(m1) : f ∈ FuncList]
trace← (Mpk,M,FuncList, ImgList)
m0 ←$ Samp(trace)
b′ ←$ A3(mb, st)
Return (b′ = b)
oracle Eval(f):
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return f(m1)
Fig. 7. Game defining the conditional preimage samplability of an FE scheme. An adversary is legitimate if R(m0,m1) holds
for every pair of messages in [M]. A sampler is legitimate if it outputs m0 ∈ [M].
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The following theorem shows that conditional preimage samplability is a sufficient condition for setup
security.
Theorem 2 (CPS ⇒ Secure Setup). Any functional encryption supporting a CPS functionality relative
to potential leakage relation R is setup-secure with respect to R.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We build a setup security simulator S using the CPS sampler Samp as
follows: run Samp on trace to get m0 and then output func(m0). We show that this simulator is successful
whenever Samp is. Suppose that there exists a setup security adversary (A1,A2) that succeeds against S.
We first observe that any setup security adversary can be converted into the first two stages (A′1,A′2) of
a CPS adversary: just use A′1 = A1 without change and let A′2 run A2 and output st := (func, v0). We
construct the third stage of a CPS attacker as follows: algorithm A′3 simply recovers (func, v) from the
input state and outputs 1 if func(mb) = v and 0 otherwise. It is clear that the CPS adversary (A′1,A′2,A′3)
will have the same advantage as the setup security adversary (A1,A2). However, we know that there can
be no CPS adversary that succeeds against Samp, which means that (A1,A2) cannot be successful. This
concludes the proof. uunionsq
Remark. We note that weaker versions of both the definitions of setup security and conditional preimage
samplability could be considered where the adversary does not get to choose the list of extracted functions
adaptively. This could be achieved by denying A2 access to Eval and giving this to A1 instead (A2 would
simply get a corresponding list of images). We did not consider this because we can achieve the stronger
versions of the definitions presented above. Looking ahead, we note that such a non-adaptive version of
collision samplability would still imply the notion of restricted preimage samplability that we will introduce
in the next section.
Concrete setup-secure schemes.We now look at concrete functionalities and show that setup security
is already achieved by many existing functional encryption schemes. We begin by defining a broad class of
functionalities where an image either entirely reveals the encrypted message, or nothing at all.
Definition 7 (All-or-Nothing Functionality). We say a functional encryption scheme supports an all-
or-nothing (ANOT) functionality if for all λ ∈ N, all (Mpk,Msk) ∈ [Setup(1λ)], all f ∈ FunSp, and all
m ∈ MsgSp we have that f(m) ∈ {m,⊥}.
As an example, consider predicate encryption systems [BSW11] where the message space is partitioned
into pairs m = (x, idx). Here, x is a hidden payload and idx is extra information that determines which tokens
can be used to recover x from a ciphertext encrypting m. More precisely, each secret key is associated with
a predicate P , and the payload can be recovered whenever P (idx) = T. Formally,
fP (x, idx) :=
{
(x, idx) if P (idx) = T ;
⊥ otherwise.
Observe that we include idx in the output of the functionality when the predicate evaluates to T, thereby
rendering the functionality all-or-nothing. It is easy to see that PKE and IBE schemes are examples of
ANOT functional encryption schemes. For PKE schemes this is obvious, since the functionality is the
identity function and the index space is empty. For IBE schemes, observe that whenever the output of the
functionality is not ⊥, the identity (i.e., the index) is also implicitly leaked by the functionality, thereby
revealing the full message. Furthermore, this also includes variants of inner-product encryption, hidden
vector encryption, etc., where a successful decryption operation explicitly reveals the encrypted index.
Our first positive result for setup security is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (ANOT⇒ CPS). Any ANOT functionality is conditionally preimage samplable in expected
polynomial time (for any potential leakage relation).
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The intuition behind the proof of this theorem is as follows. Since the functionality is all-or-nothing,
there are two possible trace outcomes. In the first, the adversary queries a function which acts as the
identity map on the message sampled from M. In this case the sampler can simply return the message.
Second, it could be the case that all the image values are ⊥. In this case the sampler will sample a message
from M and checks if it maps to ⊥ under all functions given to it in the trace. If this is the case, it
outputs the message, else it retries. The number of retries, conditioned on a given trace, will depend on
the probability that the image list is all ⊥. However, the overall expected number of retries can be shown
to be 1. We note that this is a form of rejection sampling, which guarantees that the output of the sampler
is correctly distributed. The details of the proof may be found in Appendix G, where we also discuss why
this sampler cannot be converted into a strict PPT black-box sampler by truncating the execution time.
Combining Theorems 2 and 3 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Any functional encryption scheme supporting an ANOT functionality has a secure setup
procedure with respect to expected polynomial-time simulators and arbitrary potential leakage relations.
Public-index predicate encryption. We now show that there exists a large class of FE schemes for
which we can construct a strict PPT conditional preimage sampler. Intuitively, such schemes leak more
information about encrypted messages which, when provided to the sampler, allows this stronger result to
go through (in our framework, this is captured by the potential leakage relation, which ensures that there
is a balance between the leakage trivially accessible to adversaries and that available to simulators and
samplers).
Definition 8 (Jointly All-or-Nothing Functionality). We say a functional encryption scheme sup-
ports a jointly all-or-nothing (JNOT) functionality relative to potential leakage relation R if, for all λ ∈ N,
all (Msk,Mpk) ∈ [Setup(1λ)], all subsets F ⊆ FunSp, all message distributionsM where R(m0,m1) = T for
all m0,m1 ∈ [M], we have that the following holds
∀m ∈ [M], ∃f ∈ F , f(m) = m ∨ ∀m ∈ [M], ∀f ∈ F , f(m) =⊥ .
Roughly speaking, in this definition the all-or-nothing property is no longer formulated over a single mes-
sage, but over a class of admissible message distributions defined by the potential leakage relation. Con-
cretely, R constrains the support of the message distribution M in such a way that, for any subset of
functions F extracted from the function space, the list of images will be guaranteed to, either totally re-
veal m, or to information theoretically preserve the entropy of the message distribution. In other words,
conditioningM on the information that f(m) =⊥ for all f ∈ F yieldsM itself.5
We now show that this definition is satisfied by a large class of all-or-nothing functionalities, corre-
sponding to predicate encryption systems with public index, as introduced in [BSW11]. For such schemes,
no claim about hiding idx is made. This means that their security is analyzed with respect to the special
potential leakage relation
R∗((x0, idx0), (x1, idx1)) := (|x0| = |x1| ∧ idx0 = idx1) .
The fact that message distributions are now restricted by R∗ allow us to obtain the following result.
Theorem 4. All predicate encryption systems are JNOT with respect to R∗ as defined above.
Proof. Message distributions are defined over pairs (x, idx). Further, for any message distributionM, the
restriction imposed by the potential leakage relation R guarantees that the same index idx∗ is present in all
5 Note that this is not the case for general all-or-nothing schemes, since an image list that does not reveal m may leak
information that excludes part of the support ofM as potential preimages.
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pairs in its support. Now take any subset of functions F from the function space (i.e., a set of predicates in
the appropriate class). Clearly, if for some element in the support ofM, all elements in F evaluate to ⊥,
this means that they are all rejecting idx∗. Consequently, this will also be the case for all other elements in
[M]. Conversely, if one of the predicates accepts idx∗, then the corresponding function will return (x, idx∗)
for all such elements in [M]. uunionsq
The previous result includes primitives such as PKE, (non-anonymous) IBE, non-attribute-hiding ABE,
and inner-product encryption that reveals the index in the ciphertext. We now prove the final result of this
section.
Theorem 5 (JNOT ⇒ CPS). Take an FE scheme supporting a JNOT functionality with respect to
potential leakage relation R. Then this scheme is conditionally preimage samplable (in strict polynomial
time) with respect to R.
The intuition behind the proof of this theorem is exactly the same as in Theorem 3 (we also include
it in Appendix G). The difference to all-or-nothing functionalities is that the JNOT property guarantees
that, either the sampler gets the challenge message in the image list, or sampling a single message from
the message distribution will yield a valid result. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. All (public-index) predicate encryption systems are setup-secure with respect to potential
leakage relation R∗.
7 Preimage Samplability
Despite the shortcomings of the indistinguishability model highlighted in [O’N10,BSW11], O’Neill shows
that, for certain classes of functionalities, indistinguishability-based security is no less adequate than his
proposed notion of semantic security. Indeed, it is shown in [O’N10] that if an FE scheme is preimage sam-
plable (see Appendix E) then, in the non-adaptive token-extraction attack scenario, indistinguishability and
semantic security are equivalent. Furthermore, functionalities such as those for identity-based encryption
and inner-product encryption are shown to be preimage samplable.
In light of the new syntactical and definitional approach introduced above, we propose a modified
definition of preimage samplability and show that a similar result holds. Our definition, however, permits
extending the equivalence result to the multi-message and restricted adaptive token extraction model, and
hence generalizes known results for, e.g., IBE schemes, in this area. This is an important extension, as
(restricted) adaptive extraction of secret keys is the standard attack model for all predicate encryption
systems.
Definition 9 ((Un)Restricted Preimage Samplability). We call an FE (un)restricted preimage sam-
plable for the potential leakage relation R if, for any algorithm A there exists a sampling algorithm Samp
such that the advantage function
Advmode-psFE,R,A,Samp(λ) := Pr [PSFE,R,A,Samp,mode(λ)⇒ F]
is negligible, where mode ∈ {res, unres} and game PSFE,R,A,Samp,mode is defined in Figure 8.
Comparison with O’Neill PS definition. Our definition differs from that in [O’N10] in several aspects.
First, the adversary now has access to (Msk,Mpk) rather than 1λ only. Access to Mpk is consistent with
our syntax of FE schemes, which permits generation of function space together with the master public key.
Access to Msk in needed when arguing that the actions of some IND-CPA adversary contradict preimage
samplability. More precisely, the adversary may use information dependent on the Msk (i.e., decryption
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Game PSFE,R,A,Samp,mode(λ):
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, [fj ]nj=1)←$ A(Msk,Mpk)
m0 ←$M
m1 ←$ Samp(M, [(fj , fj(m0))]nj=1,Mpk)
If (∃j : fj(m0) 6= fj(m1)) Return F
If ¬R(m0,m1) Return F
If (mode = res ∧m1 /∈ [M]) Return F
Return T
Fig. 8. Game defining (un)restricted preimage samplability. A is legitimate if R(m0,m1) holds for all m0,m1 ∈ [M].
tokens) to come up with a non-samplable message. This issue seems to have been overlooked in [O’N10].
Second, the definition is parameterized by a potential leakage relation R. This ensures that the sampler
obtains as much information about the challenge message as a real-world semantic security adversary.
Technically, this allows the equivalence proof to go through (for the non-adaptive case) for a larger class of
functional encryption schemes than those covered by O’Neill. For example, our results cover those schemes
that can be captured using our syntactic conventions, but not under those in [O’N10]. (A simple example of
this is standard (non-anonymous) IBE.) Finally, the adversary now outputs a message distribution rather
than a single message. The unrestricted sampler, similar to O’Neill’s, is only bound to producing a message
that collides with m0 on all functions. The (stronger) restricted sampler is bound to return an m1 that is
in the support of M. As we shall see, this is necessary to enable extending the equivalence result to the
restricted adaptive token extraction setting. For the unrestricted case this condition is dropped, and we end
up with a definition which is implied by (and hence weaker than) O’Neill PS definition (theM and A can
be merged). Consequently, all positive feasibility results in [O’N10] carry over to our setting.
The following theorem, proven in Appendix F, establishes equivalence between our two notions of FE
security for restricted preimage samplable schemes and restricted adaptive token extraction scenarios.
Theorem 6 (Equivalence under PS). Fix potential leakage relation R. For every IND-CPA adversary
A against scheme FE, there exist a (single-message) SS-Real adversary B and a distinguisher D such that
for any simulator S
Advind-cpaFE,R,A(λ) ≤ 2 ·Advss-cpaFE,R,B,S,D(λ) .
Furthermore, for every single-message SS-Real adversary A, there is a PS adversary C with sampler Samp,
and a SS-Ideal simulator S such that for every distinguisher D there is an IND-CPA adversary B with
Advss-cpaFE,R,A,S,D(λ) ≤ Advind-cpaFE,R,B(λ) +Advres-psFE,R,C,Samp(λ) .
The running time of S in the ideal world is that of running A in the real world plus the running time of
Samp.
We observe that the guarantee on the running time of the simulator allows us to obtain semantic security
in the multi-message scenario from single-message indistinguishability via Theorem 1, provided that the
running time of the sampler is independent of the running time of the adversary. We will see that this is
indeed the case in our feasibility results below.
Remark. The above result can be extended to a setting where samplers, adversaries and simulators may
execute in expected polynomial time. More precisely, for expected PPT preimage samplers, one can prove
that IND-CPA security with respect to expected PPT adversaries is equivalent to semantic security when
both the real-world adversary and the ideal-world simulator may run in expected polynomial time.
Feasibility. We conclude this section with a discussion of the feasibility results we obtain with the new
definition of preimage samplability. On the negative side, it is easy to see that no FE scheme supporting
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a one-way function can be preimage samplable with respect to O’Neill’s or our definition. Indeed, let f be
a one-way function and consider an adversary A(Msk,Mpk) that sets M to be the uniform distribution
on the domain of f . Now any successful Samp for A can be used to break the one-wayness of f : run
Samp(M, [f, y],Mpk), where y is the image value to be inverted, and return the result.
On the positive side, and on top of all of O’Neill’s feasibility results for the non-adaptive token extraction
scenario, we show feasibility results for restricted preimage samplability for a large class of functionalities,
which in turn immediately yield positive feasibility results for semantically secure functional encryption
under restricted adaptive token extraction scenarios.
Theorem 7 (CPS ⇒ PS). Any conditionally preimage samplable functional encryption scheme is also
restricted preimage samplable.
Proof. Any PS adversary A can be easily converted in to a CPS adversary (A′1,A′2). Let A′1 run A and
output the message distributionM and st := ([fj ]nj=1). Algorithm A′2 simply queries all functions [fj ]nj=1 to
Eval. Now observing that the PS sampler Samp takes exactly the same inputs as the CPS sampler Samp′,
which we know to exist, we will use Samp := Samp′. Since Samp′ succeeds in the CPS game, we have that
the indistinguishability of (mb, trace) for b ∈ {0, 1} implies that [fj ]nj=1 must coincide on (m0,m1) with
overwhelming probability. Furthermore m1 ∈ [M] by the legitimacy of the CPS sampler, which means that
Samp is a successful restricted sampler. uunionsq
Combining this theorem with the equivalence result in Appendix F and Corollary 1 we get that any
IND-CPA-secure FE scheme supporting an ANOT functionality is semantically secure under restricted adap-
tive token-extraction attacks and also enjoys setup security, both with respect to expected PPT simulators.
(Note that if the PS sampler runs in expected PPT, then we must impose that the original scheme is
IND-CPA-secure against expected PPT adversaries to obtain semantic security with respect to expected
PPT simulators.) For the special cases where the potential leakage relation allows us to construct a strict
PPT preimage sampler (e.g., PKE, IBE, and other predicate encryption schemes that explicitly leak the
index) the result holds for strict PPT simulators. Furthermore, since the sampler executesM once, this al-
lows us to extend the implication from single-message IND-CPA security to multi-message semantic security
under restricted adaptive token-extraction attacks.
Remark. Recall that setup security formalized the intuition that tokens and the master secret key do not
leak any “trapdoor” information about the functionality. Another way to look at this is to see it in terms
of allowing a simulator to “cheat.” For instance, the ability to control the function space generation leads
to a cheating simulator in the BSW counterexample. Our approach in defining setup security was to rule
out cheating information for free (i.e., non-black-box) simulators. However, we can also look at cheating for
black-box simulation. In particular we can look at the simulator constructed using a PS sampler. One can
argue that this simulator is “non-cheating,” as it uses its state info in exactly the same way as the real-world
adversary uses it, and assuming that the real-world adversary cannot cheat by definition. However, this still
leaves open the possibility of leakage through tokens which, as we have discussed, is a grey area in terms
of intuitive security/insecurity. We leave demonstrating a separation here as an interesting open problem,
as this would imply a functionality that is PS but not CPS.
8 Inner-Product Encryption
Inner-product encryption (IPE) [KSW08] is a form of functional encryption where the index space corre-
sponds to vectors x in Zmq , and each secret key is also associated with a vector y in Zmq . The associated
predicate is given by
Py(x) :=
{
T if 〈x,y〉 = 0 mod q ;
F otherwise.
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Without loss of generality, we will concentrate on the predicate-only version of inner-product encryption,
where the payload is empty and the functionality is fy(m) = Py(x). Note that IPE is not an all-or-nothing
functionality, since upon successful decryption one does not learn x.
Our goal is to show that inner-product encryption is not restricted preimage samplable. To this end,
we will rely on well-established intractable problems related to finding short solutions to linear equations.
More precisely, we will be relying on the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem and a decisional variant of
it that we call DSIS [MR07,GPV08,Lyu12] (see Appendix H for the details).
We will show that, for certain parameters q,m in the inner-product functionality, no restricted preimage
sampler can be successful against the PS adversary A shown in Figure 9. This adversary is parameterized
by four values n, m, q, and d, all of which we assume to be polynomial in the security parameter. This
guarantees that the algorithm executes in polynomial time.
Algorithm Aq,n,m,d(Msk,Mpk):
For i from 1 to n do
yi ←$ Zmq
SetM to uniform on B(d)m
Return (M,y1, . . . ,yn)
Fig. 9. PS adversary for the inner-product encryption.
The formal statement of our result is as follows.
Theorem 8 (IPE Is Not Restricted PS). Take the PS adversary A as defined in Figure 9. Then for
any PPT sampler Samp, there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2 such that
1−Advres-psFE,R,Aq,n,m,d,Samp(λ) ≤ Adv
(q,m,n,d)-dsis
B1 (λ) +Adv
(q′,m′,n′,β)-sis
B2 (λ) + ν(λ) ,
where d = qn/m, q′ = q, m′ = m, n′ = n/q −√n/q log(n/q), β = d√m, and ν(λ) is a negligible function
depending on q and n.
We note that this is a stronger result than what we need as it establishes that the sampler will fail with
overwhelming probability. We leave the details of the proof to Appendix H, where we also briefly discuss
how to extend the theorem to large values of q, and give a high-level overview here.
The main idea behind the proof is that a successful sampler should match the zero values in the image
list it receives, while being restricted to outputting solutions in the support of the message distribution,
which consists of small vectors. In other words, the sampler is solving a system of linear equations with
a small solution. This allows us to establish a connection with the SIS problem. Despite this, in order to
solve a SIS problem instance using the sampler, we need to make sure that the sampler is forced to match
sufficiently many zeros. (Note it cannot be the case that sampling a random message leads to only zero
image values as otherwise we can preimage sample by repeated sampling as before.) Hence enough zero
and nonzero values must be present in the image list. We achieve this by making sure the adversary A
returns more vectors yi than the SIS dimension n′. But now there is a problem as we do not know the
image values for the newly generated vectors. This is where we appeal to the DSIS problem and simply
assume these values are random: any change in the sampler’s success probability would translate to a DSIS
break. We are now in a position where we can reduce to the SIS problem. We assign the rows of the SIS
matrix to (some of) the zeros in the randomly generated values, and assign the newly generated rows to
the remaining ones. A successful sampler for this set of images would also solve the SIS problem instance.
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A Counterexample with a Fixed Function Space
Consider the following alternative version of the TDP-based counterexample presented in Section 4. Take a
functional encryption scheme that is token non-adaptive BSW semantically secure, and suppose it supports
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the a family of trapdoor one-way permutations (for any choice of f), as well as the identity function. Modify
this scheme by sampling a special circuit f? at setup, and include it in the Mpk. Again, the corresponding
trapdoor is “forgotten” by the setup algorithm. We use the token for the identity function for f? and
the original tokens for the other functions in the function space. The decryption procedure is modified
accordingly similarly to the counterexample given in Figure 3.
This scheme should be intuitively classified as insecure, as an adversary that extracts the token for
f? learns more than it should about the message. However, the BSW semantic security of the original
scheme allows proving that the modified scheme is also BSW semantically secure. Given any adversary A
against the modified scheme, construct an adversary A′ against the original scheme by letting A′1 run A1
on Mpk plus the description of an f? which A′1 samples accordingly to the definition of the TDP. Token-
extraction queries on this f? are answered by extracting the identity function instead; for other functions,
the token-extraction oracle is used directly. A′2 simply runs A2. The security of the original scheme implies
a black-box simulator S ′. Observe that if A1 extracts the token for f?, then A′1 will be extracting the token
for the identity function, which means S ′3 has access to m.
We now use S ′ to construct a simulator S for the modified scheme. S1 uses S ′1 to obtain (Mpk, τ),
it generates a new f?, and keeps the trapdoor for it and τ in its state. S2 uses S ′2 to answer the token-
extraction queries, keeping a list of all such queries, and obtaining the token for the identity function if the
adversary extracts f?. Finally, S3 runs S ′3 forwarding inputs and outputs. The only caveat occurs when S ′3
queries the Eval oracle on the identity function. Whenever this is the case, S3 checks its records to see if
this query corresponds to an extraction query on f? and, if so, obtains an image under f? instead. Since S3
knows a trapdoor, it can invert the image and provide the unique correct value to S ′3 to ensure a correct
simulation. On the other hand, by ensuring that the correct f? query is placed on Eval, algorithm S3 is
able to satisfy the requirement of making the same queries as those of the real adversary.
B PKE Semantic Security
We recall Goldreich’s definition of semantic security for public-key encryption scheme in Figure 10. This
definition is taken from [Gol04, Definition 5.4.8].
Definition 10 (PKE Semantic Security). A public-key encryption scheme, (Gen,Enc,Dec), is said to be
semantically secure under chosen-plaintext attacks if for every pair of PPT oracle machines, A := (A1,A2),
there exists a pair of PPT algorithms, S := (S1,S2), such that
Advss-cpaPKE,A,S(λ) := Pr [SS-RealPKE,A(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [SS-IdealPKE,S(λ)⇒ T]
is negligible, where games SS-RealPKE,A and SS-IdealPKE,S are shown in Figure 10. Furthermore, we require
the traces in the two games to be identically distributed.
Game SS-RealPKE,A(λ):
(sk, pk)←$ PKGen(1λ)
((M, h, func), st)←$ A1(pk)
m←$M
c←$ PKEnc(m,Mpk)
v ←$ A2(c, h(m), st)
trace← (M, h, func)
Return (v = func(m))
Game SS-IdealPKE,S(λ):
((M, h, func), st)←$ S1(1λ)
m←$M
v ←$ S2(1|m|, h(m), st)
trace← (M, h, func)
Return (v = func(m))
Fig. 10. Games defining the semantic security of a PKE scheme.
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C A Naïve Approach to Excluding Counterexamples
The most immediate approach to address all the counterexamples presented in the paper is to constrain
the simulator so that the ideal-world experiment directly captures the intuition that the simulator can only
get to see the images. This definition is presented in Figure 11 and it formalizes the following intuition:
(Strong Intuition) The information leaked by a ciphertext and a set of decryption tokens is no
more than that leaked by an equivalent set of images.
Note that the simulator is highly restricted in that it can no longer control the parameter generation
procedure, and that it gets no more information about the master secret key than that leaked directly by
the master public key (in particular, it does not have access to a token oracle). Clearly in this definition
the simulator has access only to public information and a set of images, which matches the strong intuition
of security.
Game SS-RealFE,R,A,D(λ):
FuncList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
c←$ Enc(m,Mpk)
v ←$ AToken2 (c, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return TK
Game SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; m←⊥
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ SEval1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
ImgList← [f(m) : f ∈ FuncList]
v ←$ SEval2 (ImgList, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Eval(f):
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return f(m)
Fig. 11. Games defining the “strong” semantic security of an FE scheme.
It is straightforward to show that this definition is unrealizable for an FE scheme that supports at
least one function. Indeed, consider a real-world adversary that requests a token for a function f and
outputs v := (TKf , f). Define a distinguisher which checks if TKf is well formed by encrypting a random
message m, decrypting the resulting ciphertext using TKf , and checking equality with f(m). It is clear
that any simulator that could emulate this sequence of calls (which it would have to do so the traces are
indistinguishable) can be used to extract a valid token, leading to a break of security.
D Proof of the Composition Theorem
We start by formally defining multi-message semantic security.
Definition 11 (Multi-Message Semantic Security). Let gamesM-SS-RealFE,R,A andM-SS-IdealFE,R,A,S
be as shown in Figure 12.6 The semantic security of an FE scheme relative to potential leakage relation R
requires that for any PPT adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a legitimate PPT simulator S = (S1,S2)
such that for all PPT distinguishers D the following advantage function is negligible.
Advm-ss-cpaFE,R,A,S,D(λ) := Pr [M-SS-RealFE,R,A,D(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [M-SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ)⇒ T]
We are now ready to prove the composition theorem.
6 When we say that a relation R holds for R(m0,m1) we mean that the relation holds point-wise on all elements.
26
Game M-SS-RealFE,R,A(λ):
FuncList← [ ]
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
c←$ Enc(m,Mpk)
v ←$ AToken2 (c, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return TK
Game M-SS-IdealFE,R,A,S(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; m←⊥
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ SEval1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
ImgList← [f(m) : f ∈ FuncList]
v ←$ SEval2 (ImgList, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Eval(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return (TK, f(m))
Fig. 12. Games defining the multi-message semantic security of an FE scheme under restricted adaptive token-extraction
attacks. An adversary is legitimate if: 1) R(m0,m1) holds for every pair of messages in [M]1; 2) for all second-stage Token
queries f , we have that f(m0) = f(m1) for all m0,m1 ∈ [M]1; and 3) in the token non-adaptive model, A2 and S2 do not call
Token and Eval respectively.
Proof. The proof proceeds as a sequences of game where we show for any adversary Ai in Gamei there
is an adversary Ai+1 in Gamei+1 which does as well as Ai in attacking the scheme. Moreover, Game0 is
defined such that it corresponds to be the multi-message real-world environment, while the final game
Gameq will correspond to the multi-message ideal-world environment. This would prove the theorem. So,
for i = 0, . . . , q, where q is an upper bound on the number of messages that are output in the multi-message
game, we define a series of games Gamei as shown below.
Game GameiFE,R,A,D(λ):
FuncList← [ ]; m←⊥
(Msk,Mpk)←$ Setup(1λ)
(M, st)←$ AToken1 (Mpk)
(m, h, t)←$M
c←$ Enc([m]q−i1 ,Mpk)
ImgList← [f([m]qq−i+1) : f ∈ FuncList]
v ←$ AToken2 (c, ImgList, h, st)
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
oracle Token(f):
TK←$ TKGen(f,Msk)
FuncList← f : FuncList
Return (TK, f([m]qq−i+1))
For a given adversary Ai in Gamei, we construct a single-message adversary Bi as shown below.
Adversary Bi,1(Mpk):
Run Ai,1(Mpk)
Token(f) queries:
Query own Token(f) to get TK
Return (TK,⊥)
Ai,1 terminates with (M, st)
ConstructM′ as shown
Return (M′, st)
Adversary Bi,2(c, h′, st):
(c˜, ImgList, h)← h′
(m′, ·, ·)←$M
Run Ai,2([c˜, c], ImgList, h, st)
Token(f) queries:
Query own Token(f) to get TK
Return (TK, f([m′]qq−i+1))
Ai,2 terminates with v
Return v
Algorithm M′:
(m, h, t)←$M
c˜←$ Enc([m]q−i−11 ,Mpk)
ImgList← [f([m]qq−i+1) :
f ∈ FuncList]
h′ ← (c˜, ImgList, h)
t′ ← (M, t)
Return ([m]q−i, h′, t′)
For any distinguisher D in Gamei we define a single-message distinguisher D′ as shown below.
Distinguisher D′(trace′, v):
(Mpk,M′, t′,FuncList)← trace′
(M, t)← t′
trace← (Mpk,M, t,FuncList)
Return D(trace, v)
By code expansion we get that
Pr
[
GameiFE,R,Ai,D(λ)⇒ T
]
= Pr
[
SS-RealFE,R,Bi,D′(λ)⇒ T
]
.
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By the single-message semantic security of the scheme, we are guaranteed that a simulator Si replicates
Bi’s attack, while getting a list of images [f([m]q−i) : f ∈ FuncList ] rather than the ciphertext c. Therefore
for any D′ we have that
Pr
[
SS-RealFE,R,Bi,D′(λ)⇒ T
]
= Pr
[
SS-IdealFE,R,Si,D′(λ)⇒ T
]
+Advss-cpaFE,R,Bi,Si,D′(λ) .
Taking the simulator Si, we construct a hybrid adversary Ai+1 in Gamei+1 as shown below.
Adversary Ai+1,1(Mpk):
Run Si,1(Mpk)
Eval(f) queries:
Query own Token(f) to get (TK,⊥)
Return (TK,⊥)
Si,1 terminates with (M′, st)
ConstructM as shown
Return (M, st)
Adversary Ai+1,2(c, ImgList, h, st) :
Run Si,2([ImgList]q−i, [c, [ImgList]qq−i+1, h], st)
Eval(f) queries:
Query own Token(f) to get (TK, z)
Return (TK, z)
Si,2 terminates with v
Return v
Algorithm M:
([m]q−i, h′, t′)←$M′
(M, t)← t′
(m, h, t)←$M
Return (m, h, t)
Now, observing that the message distribution passed to D inside D′ is identical to the message distribution
output by Ai+1,1, we get by code expansion that for any D′ which is built from a D
Pr
[
SS-IdealFE,R,Si,D′(λ)⇒ T
]
= Pr
[
Gamei+1FE,RAi+1,D(λ)⇒ T
]
.
Therefore, putting the above together we obtain that for any adversary Ai and distinguisher D in Gamei,
there is an adversary Ai+1 against Gamei+1 such that
Pr
[
GameiFE,R,Ai,D(λ)⇒ T
]
= Pr
[
Gamei+1FE,R,Ai+1,D(λ)⇒ T
]
+ νi(λ) ,
where νi are negligible. It is easy to check that our requirements on the execution time of a single-message
simulator guarantees that the final adversary Aq also runs in polynomial time. Putting this sequence of
inequalities together for 0 ≤ i ≤ q, the theorem follows. uunionsq
E O’Neill’s Preimage Samplability
We recall the definition of preimage samplability due to O’Neill [O’N10].
Definition 12 (O’Neill’s Preimage Samplability). We say a function space FunSp(1λ) is O’Neill
preimage samplable if there exists a sampling algorithm Samp such that for any algorithm A the following
advantage is negligible, where game ON-PSFunSp,Samp,A is given in Figure 13.
Advon-psFunSp,Samp,A(λ) := Pr [ON-PSFunSp,Samp,A(λ)⇒ F] .
Game ON-PSFunSp,Samp,A(λ):
(m0, [fj ]
n
j=1)←$ A(FunSp(1λ))
m1 ←$ Samp(1λ, |m0|, [(fj , fj(m0))]nj=1)
If |m1| 6= |m0| Return F
If (∃j : fj(m0) 6= fj(m1)) Return F
Return T
Fig. 13. Game defining O’Neill’s preimage samplability.
O’Neill’s preimage samplability is defined for a function space. Whenever FE is a functional encryption
scheme with a fixed function space, we say it is O’Neill preimage samplable if its function space is O’Neill
preimage samplable.
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F Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. For the first part of the theorem, suppose the FE scheme is not IND-CPA-secure. We show that it
cannot be SS-CPA-secure. Take any IND-CPA adversary A = (A1,A2), and construct an SS-Real adversary
B = (B1,B2) as follows. Algorithm B1 runs A1. Whenever A1 queries its Token oracle, B1 makes the same
query, providing the answer to A1. When A1 outputs two messages (m0,m1) and a state st, algorithm B1
constructs the message distributionM that assigns probability 1/2 to each of these messages and returns
h =⊥ and t = m, where m is the sampled message. It then outputsM and its own state, which includes
the states of A1 and M. Algorithm B2 resumes A2 (using the stored state), also passing it the challenge
ciphertext that it receives. When A2 performs an adaptive Token oracle query, B2 makes the same query,
providing the answer to A. When A2 outputs a bit b′, algorithm B2 outputs mb′ . Note that the restrictions
on A’s queries in the IND-CPA game ensure that adversary B is legitimate with respect to R. We now define
a distinguisher D as follows
D((Mpk,M, t,FuncList), v) := (v = t ∧ ∀f ∈ FuncList, f(m0) = f(m1)) ,
where m0 and m1 are recovered from the support of the message distribution. Given the legitimacy of
adversary A, we therefore have that
Pr [IND-CPAFE,R,A(λ)⇒ T] = Pr [SS-RealFE,R,B,D(λ)⇒ T] .
Now, since we assume that the FE scheme is semantically secure, we know there exists a simulator S that
produces a pair (trace, v) that is indistinguishable from that occurring in the real world to D. We also
know that D will only return true in the ideal-world experiment if the message distribution is correctly
formed and f(m0) = f(m1) for all functions. However, it is clear that in this case the simulator receives no
information about b. We must have that, for any S,
Pr [SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ)⇒ T] ≤ 1/2 .
The first part of the theorem follows from the combination of this equation with the one we obtained for
the real world and from the definition of IND-CPA advantage.
For the second part, assume that the scheme is IND-CPA-secure and preimage samplable. We show that it is
also SS-CPA-secure. Take any adversary A = (A1,A2) against SS-Real. We construct an SS-Ideal simulator
S with a similar advantage as follows. S1 runs A1 keeping track of all its inputs, outputs and interactions
with the Token oracle in its state (if A1 calls the Token oracle, then S1 uses its own oracle to provide the
answers to the adversary). The message distribution output of S1 is identical to that output by A1.
Before defining S2, let us define the following PS adversary C[A1] associated to A1:7
– C runs A1, answering A1’s token-extraction queries using the master secret key provided to it, and
constructing a list of queried functions [fj ]nj=1.
– When A1 outputs M′, algorithm C defines M as the message distribution that runs M′ and outputs
the first component m.
– C then outputsM and the list of functions [fj ]nj=1 queried by A1.
Note that C[A1] is legitimate as A1 is. Now since FE is preimage samplable, we know there exists a sampler
Samp that succeeds with overwhelming probability in the PS game against C[A1].
7 By structuring the argument in this way, we are establishing a stronger result by letting the sampler to depend on the
adversary.
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We define algorithm S2 using this sampler Samp. On input (ImgList, h, st), algorithm S2 samples a
message m′ using Samp(M, [(fj , fj(m))]nj=1,Mpk). It encrypts m′ to obtain c, and runs A2 on (c, h, st[A1]).
If A2 calls the Token oracle, then S2 uses its own oracle to provide the answers to the adversary. When
A2 outputs v, algorithm S2 also outputs this and terminates.
We show that, for any distinguisher D, the simulator constructed above does as well as the adversary.
To this end, we define an IND-CPA security adversary B = (B1,B2) as follows. Algorithm B1 runs A1,
answering its Token queries using its own oracle. It also keeps a list of queried functions [fj ]nj=1. When it
obtains a message distributionM, it samples a tuple (m0, h0, t0) fromM and constructs a list of images
[fj(m0)]
n
j=1. Next it samples a message m1 using Samp(M, [fj , fj(m0)]nj=1,Mpk). Algorithm B1 checks if
the functions collides on (m0,m1) and R(m0,m1) holds. It stops by returning a random guess if these are
not the case. Otherwise it outputs (m0,m1) to LR and keeps the information it collected as its state. In
the second stage, B2 runs A2 on (c, h0, st[A1]) as follows. If A2 calls the Token oracle, then B2 first checks
if the function collides on (m0,m1), and again stops early by returning a random guess if this is not the
case. Otherwise, it uses its own Token oracle to provide a token for the adversary. When A2 outputs v,
adversary B2 outputs D((Mpk,M, t0,FuncList), v).
Conditioned on the event E that the adversary B does not stop early (whose probability we bound
below), it is easy to see that B is legitimate and furthermore if the bit chosen in the IND-CPA game is 0,
we obtain an output v as in the real game. In case it is 1, we get an output v as in the ideal game with a
simulator as defined above. Therefore
Pr [SS-RealFE,R,A,D(λ)⇒ T] = Pr [IND-CPAFE,R,B(λ)⇒ T | b = 0 ∧ E]
Pr [SS-IdealFE,R,S,D(λ)⇒ T] = Pr [IND-CPAFE,R,B(λ)⇒ T | b = 1 ∧ E] .
We now bound the probability that adversary B stops early. Observe that when this happens, the PS
adversary C[A1] breaks Samp. Indeed, there can be three reasons for a premature termination: 1) first-stage
functions do not collide on the messages; 2) R is not satisfied by the messages; or 3) second-stage functions
do not collide on the messages. All of these would immediately translate to C[A1] causing Samp to return
a message that does not satisfy one of the checks in the PS game (note that we need the legitimacy of A2
to argue for this for the third case). We therefore have
Pr [¬E] ≤ Advres-psFE,R,C,Samp(λ) .
The theorem follows by an application of the fundamental lemma of game-playing [BR06]. uunionsq
G Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We define a CPS sampler as shown in Figure 14.
Algorithm Samp(trace):
(Mpk,M,FuncList, ImgList)← trace
If m ∈ ImgList s.t. m 6=⊥ Return m
Do
m′ ←$M
ImgList′ ← [f(m′) : f ∈ FuncList]
If (ImgList = ImgList′) Return m′
Fig. 14. CPS sampler for ANOT functionalities.
Note that Samp is always successful on termination. We show that Samp terminates in expected poly-
nomial time. Let ptrace be the probability that the image values contain the message in the clear, when one
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conditions on the occurrence of a specific trace. If ptrace = 1 then the number of loop iterations is zero.
When ptrace < 1, we have
E [number of iterations | trace] = 0 · ptrace + (1− ptrace) ·
∞∑
n=1
n · pn−1trace(1− ptrace) = 1 .
Therefore
E [number of iterations] =
∑
ptrace<1
1 · ptrace ≤ 1 .
Furthermore, the sampler always returns a message that is identically distributed to the actual message
used in calculating the image list as it sampled fromM conditioned on colliding images. uunionsq
The proof for Theorem 5 uses exactly the same sampler as define above. However note that if the
functionality is JNOT with respect to R, then the legitimacy of A essentially implies that Samp will either
get m upfront in the image list, or it is guaranteed to succeed in sampling a valid message in a single
iteration of the look. This is because the JNOT property says that, whatever rejection pattern you obtain
for a message in the support ofM, this will be the same for all messages in the support ofM.
On strict polynomial-time samplers. Let us define a strict PPT sampler that samples a total of at
most q(λ) messages, for an a priori fixed q, as above, and fails if no correct preimage is found. We first
show here that such sampler cannot be “universal,” i.e., it cannot succeed with an overwhelming probability
against all PPT adversaries. To this end, consider the adversary which returns a distribution and a function
as follows.
Mq,λ :=
{
m0 with prob. 1− 1q(λ) ;
m1 with prob. 1q(λ) .
fm0(m) :=
{
m if m = m0 ;
⊥ otherwise.
Here m0 and m1 are two fixed messages in the message space. The probability of the failure of the sampler
against this adversary is
Pr [Fail] = (1− 1
q(λ)
)q(λ) · 1
q(λ)
= Θ
(
1
q(λ)
)
,
which is noticeable. Now recall that our definition of preimage samplability allows the sampler to depend on
the adversary. This dependency might be sufficient to allow for a (non-universal) PPT sampler. (Indeed, for
PS adversaries as given above such a sampler exists.) Despite this, we also rule out the existence of samplers
which follow the above rejection sampling strategy. Consider the following adversary which “diagonalizes”
over all distributionsMq,λ. On input the security parameter λ, the adversary samples i←$ {1, . . . , λ} and
returns (Mi,λ, fm0), where
Mc,λ :=
{
m0 with prob. 1− 1λc ;
m1 with prob. 1− 1λc .
and fm0(m) :=
{
m if m = m0 ;
⊥ otherwise.
Note that |λλ| ∈ O(λ2), and this adversary runs in polynomial time. Now for any constant d, the failure
probability of the sampler that performs at most λd trials is
Pr [Fail] =
λ∑
i=1
(1− 1
λi
)λ
d · 1
λi
· 1
λ
= Ω
(
1
λd+1
)
,
which is noticeable.
We note that this result does not exclude the existence of samplers that take advantage of extra (non-
black-box) properties of the message distributions. For instance the condition that the potential leakage
relation is true for any pair of messages in the support of the returned distributions, which is the case for,
say, non-anonymous IBE schemes, leads to a strict PPT sampler.
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H Proof of Theorem 8
In what follows n, m, q, d, and β are polynomials in a security parameter λ. However, in order to ease
notation we drop the explicit dependency on λ and write, for example, m for m(λ). The polynomials n, m,
and d take values in N, q takes values in the set of primes, and β ∈ R+. We also consider Zq, for an odd q,
to be encoded in the range B(q/2) := [−bq/2c, bq/2c].
Definition 13 (The Small Integer Solution (SIS) Problem). Let A ∈ Zn×mq be a matrix sampled
uniformly at random from Zn×mq . The (q,m, n, β)-SIS problem consists of, given A, finding a nonzero
vector x ∈ Zmq of `2-norm at most β satisfying Ax = 0 mod q. Formally, we define the advantage of an
adversary A against this problem as
Adv
(q,m,n,β)-sis
A (λ) := Pr
[
Ax = 0 mod q ∧ ‖x‖2 ≤ β : A←$ Zn×mq ; x←$ A(A)
]
.
Typical parameters for the SIS problem to be hard are q = nO(1), m = Θ(n log q), and β =
√
m · qn/m.
Definition 14 (The Decisional Small Integer Solution (DSIS) Problem). Let A ∈ Zn×mq be a matrix
sampled uniformly at random from Zn×mq . Let t be uniform in Znq and x be a uniform vector in B(d)m.
The (q,m, n, d)-DSIS problem consists of distinguishing the distributions (A,Ax) and (A, t). Formally, we
define the advantage of an adversary A against this problem as
Adv
(q,m,n,d)-dsis
A (λ) := Pr
[
b = 0 : A←$ Zn×mq ; x←$ B(d)m; b←$ A(A,Ax)
]
− Pr [b = 0 : A←$ Zn×mq ; t←$ Znq ; b←$ A(A, t)] .
Typical parameters for the DSIS problem to be hard are q = nO(1), m = Θ(n log q), and d = qn/m.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof. We rewrite the restricted PS experiment with respect to the adversary A in Figure 9 in the following
simplified form, which we will call Game0.
Game0(λ):
Y ←$ Zn×mq
x←$ B(d)m
t← Yx
Zeros← { i : [t]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
x′ ←$ Samp(Y,Zeros)
t′ ← Yx′
Zeros′ ← { i : [t′]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If Zeros 6= Zeros′ ∨ x′ 6∈ B(d)m Return F
Return T
We now modify Game0 by sampling t uniformly at random to obtain Game1.
Game1(λ):
Y ←$ Zn×mq
t←$ Znq
Zeros← { i : [t]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
x′ ←$ Samp(Y,Zeros)
t′ ← Yx′
Zeros′ ← { i : [t′]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If Zeros 6= Zeros′ ∨ x′ 6∈ B(d)m Return F
Return T
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We show that any change in the sampler’s behavior can be translated into an attack on the (q,m, n, d)-DSIS
problem by constructing adversary B1 as follows.
B1(A, t):
Y ← A
Zeros← { i : [t]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
x′ ←$ Samp(Y,Zeros)
t′ ← Yx′
Zeros′ ← { i : [t′]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If Zeros 6= Zeros′ ∨ x′ 6∈ B(d)m Return F
Return T
It is clear that by construction, we have
Pr [Game0(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [Game1(λ)⇒ T] = Adv(q,m,n,d)-dsisB1 (λ) .
We now modify Game1 so that the sampler immediately loses the game if there are at most n′ zero
positions in t. This gives Game2.
Game2(λ):
Y ←$ Zn×mq
t←$ Znq
Zeros← { i : [t]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If |Zeros| ≤ n′ Return F
x′ ←$ Samp(Y,Zeros)
t′ ← Yx′
Zeros′ ← { i : [t′]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If Zeros 6= Zeros′ ∨ x′ 6∈ B(d)m Return F
Return T
By the fundamental lemma of game-playing [BR06], we have that
Pr [Game1(λ)⇒ T]− Pr [Game2(λ)⇒ T] ≤ Pr
[|Zeros| ≤ n′] .
Since t is sampled uniformly at random from Znq , we have that the probability of getting a zero in each
position is exactly 1/q. By the standard Chernoff–Hoeffding bounds on the tails of the binomial distribution
for n′ ≤ n/q we have
Pr
[|Zeros| ≤ n′] ≤ exp(−q
2
· (n/q − n
′)2
n
)
.
Setting n′ = n/q −√n/q log(n/q), we obtain a negligible bound. This justifies our choice of n′ in the
theorem statement.
To conclude the proof, we construct an algorithm B2 that converts any sampler succeeding with non-
negligible probability in game Game2 into a successful attacker on the (q,m, n′, β)-SIS problem.
B2(A):
t←$ Znq
Zeros← { i : [t]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If |Zeros| ≤ n′ Return ⊥
B←$ Z(n−n′)×mq
Y ← [At|Bt]t
PermuteRows(Y, n′,Zeros)
x′ ←$ Samp(Y,Zeros)
t′ ← Yx′
Zeros′ ← { i : [t′]i = 0 ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
If Zeros 6= Zeros′ ∨ x′ 6∈ B(d)m Return ⊥
Return x′
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Here, PermuteRows is a deterministic algorithm that permutes the rows of Y so that the first n′ rows of
the matrix are moved into the subset of rows indicated by Zeros. Observe that, if B2 reaches this point of
execution, there are always enough rows so that PermuteRows can always succeed.
It is clear that the inputs provided to Samp in the simulation are correctly distributed under the rules
of Game2. Furthermore, if the sampler succeeds, then it will have output a vector x′ of norm at most d
√
m
that is guaranteed to satisfy Ax′ = 0, and therefore is a valid solution to the given (q,m, n′, d
√
m)-SIS
problem instance. uunionsq
For example, based on the parameters for the hardness of the SIS and DSIS problems, for any constant
δ ∈ (0, 1) we may set
n = λ, q = λδ, m = λ2, d = λδ/λ ≈ 1, n′ = λ1−δ −
√
λ1−δ log λ, β ≈ λ .
Note that our slightly larger choice for m ensures that qn/m and qn′/m are approximately 1 so that the
number of columns in the SIS and DSIS problems can be the same. The smallness conditions in the two
problems match, i.e., qn/m
√
m = qn
′/m′
√
m′.
Large modulus. The SIS and DSIS problems are also hard when the modulus q is large [MR07]. However,
in this case the argument given above for small values of q becomes vacuous as the n′ = O(n/q) condition no
longer applies (the probability of hitting zero becomes negligible). We deal with this problem by restricting
the matrices to be uniform over Zn×mq′ where q
′  q. This leads to the following analogues of the SIS and
DSIS problems over the integers (where we have made the simplifying assumption that q =∞).
Definition 15 (The Subset-Sum (SS) Problem). Let A ∈ Zn×mq be a matrix sampled uniformly at
random from Zn×mq . The (q,m, n, β)-SS problem for a given A consists of finding a nonzero vector x ∈ Zm
of `2-norm at most β satisfying Ax = 0 over Z. Formally, we define the advantage of an adversary A as
Adv
(q,m,n,β)-ss
A (λ) := Pr
[
Ax = 0 in Z ∧ ‖x‖2 ≤ β : A←$ Zn×mq ; x←$ A(A)
]
.
Note that the (q,m, n, β)-SS problem is at least as hard as the (q,m, n, β)-SIS problem.
Definition 16 (The Decisional Subset-Sum (DSS) Problem). Let A ∈ Zn×mq be a matrix sampled
uniformly at random from Zn×mq . Define the distribution
Z(q,m, d) :=
m∑
i=1
XiYi
over the integers, where Yi are uniform over Zq and Xi are uniform over B(d). Let t and x be sampled
from Z(q,m, d)n and uniformly at random from B(d)m respectively. The (q,m, n, d)-DSS problem consists
of distinguishing the distributions (A,Ax) and (A, t) when matrix multiplication is performed over the
integers. Formally, we define the advantage of an adversary A as
Adv
(q,m,n,d)-dss
A (λ) := Pr
[
b = 0 : A←$ Zn×mq ; x←$ Zmq ; b←$ A(A,Ax in Z)
]
− Pr [b = 0 : A←$ Zn×mq ; t←$ Z(q,m, d)n; b←$ A(A, t)] .
Note that if inner-product values and matrix multiplication are calculated modulo q, we recover the
DSIS problem: Z(q,m, d) will be uniform over Zq. Under the hardness of the above problems, which we
conjecture to be true for a set of parameters that can be embedded in the inner-product encryption preimage
samplability scenario, the proof of non-samplability for large moduli closely follows that for small q. Note
that the probability of hitting zero when sampling from Z, by the central-limit theorem, is approximately
1/
√
2pimσ2, where σ2 = 19q(q+ 1)d(d+ 1) is the variance of XiYi. We defer the details to a final treatment.
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